Issues in Israeli Society
6) Ethnicity and the Socio-Economic Gap in Israel
By: Jonathan Kaplan
An ethnic group usually refers to a set of people who consciously
share certain characteristics such as religion, origin, culture or
language, and are linked by common interests and some form of
social participation. Members of such a group share an ethnic
identity, or awareness of a distinctive origin and way of life.
Different societies respond to the
existence of ethnic identities in different ways, and social trends
may also vary over time. In addition, ethnic minorities differ in
their desire and ability to maintain a distinct identity within the
host society. Often, ethnic traditions are adapted to the majority
culture. Shaped by developments within the host society, contact
with the society of origin and the interaction between the two,
ethnic identity can evolve and adapt itself to new circumstances.
Ethnicity in an Israeli Setting
As we have seen, Israeli society absorbed large numbers of Jewish
immigrants who brought with them much of their culture and
heritage. In so far as these immigrant groups came from various
geographical locations, spoke different languages, possessed
diverse cultural values and maintained separate organizational
frameworks, they resembled the phenomenon of ethnic groups
described above. However, unlike the ethnic groups of modern
immigrant societies, these "edot" (literally communities) or ethnic
sub-groups also had much in common with the veteran Jewish
residents.
They were all Jewish.
All were familiar with a common
set of religious beliefs and traditions relating to an
all-encompassing life-style. Many immigrants and veterans alike had
grown up in a relatively traditional society: either in Eastern
Europe or in the Middle East and North Africa. The synagogue, the
holidays and religious traditions were not foreign to these
immigrants, even to those who had abandoned a religiously observant
orientation. Nor were the ideas and images associated with the
Jewish return to the promised Land of Israel alien to these people. Many
cultural expressions, often related to Jewish religious observance,
united the immigrants: cholent/hamin on Saturdays, the Passover
Seder, lighting the menorah on Hannukah, the Bar Mitzvah and the
Jewish wedding celebration. In addition, most had experienced
manifestations of anti-semitism such as discrimination,
persecution, and violent attacks.
The attachment these immigrants had to the reality
from which they had come was moderated by memories of hostility and
rejection. Both from a religious and a national viewpoint, Jews
shared a common origin. It appeared that Jews also shared a common
fate, as the Holocaust and the widespread hostility toward Jews in
the Moslem world on one hand, and the mass migration to Israel on
the other seemed to indicate.
Israel embodied the view that the Jews comprised
one nation, and that the country was the true home
of the immigrants. This was expressed in the Law of Return, passed
by the Knesset in 1950, which stated: "Every Jew has the right to
immigrate to the country." Absorption of Jews in Israel was
therefore perceived primarily not in broad humanitarian terms, but
rather as part of the Zionist goal to reunite Jews from all corners
of the earth in the Jewish State and to forge a new national
identity. Jewish immigrants were to be integrated into the new
Israeli society.
Another uniting factor was the fact that once in
the country, the new immigrants were faced with the same security
problems that threatened the entire society. Participation in the
defense of the Jewish state undoubtedly accentuated feelings of
solidarity on the part of both the newcomers and the veteran
population. For these reasons, the nature of ethnicity in Israel is
somewhat unique. While "edot" maintain distinct cultural traditions
and organizational frameworks, there is a much greater degree of
commonality and unity among the various sections of the Israeli
Jewish population than in other immigrant societies.
Although it is possible to identify dozens and perhaps even
hundreds of Jewish "edot" in Israel, the notion of ethnic identity
is associated primarily with immigrant groups from the Middle East
and North Africa.
Immigrants from Europe did form organizations,
but these were usually designed to provide mutual aid, especially
during the difficult early stages of integration into Israeli
society. Societies were also established to research or memorialize
particular European communities. However, these groups were not
designed to advance particular interests of a broader nature or to
perpetuate ethnic identity and culture. Identification with a
particular European community decreased considerably among
native-born Israelis although they continued be aware of their
Ashkenazi origins. A stronger sense of ethnic identity developed
among Oriental Jews due to the more limited effects of
westernization in their communities, their feelings of deprivation
and discrimination engendered by the process of absorption during
the 1950s, the lingering socio-economic gap and the connection of
ethnicity with politics.
The Socio-Economic Gap:
As noted in an earlier lecture, immigrants from Asia and Africa during
the 1950s generally began their life in Israel at a considerable
social and economic disadvantage compared to the veteran Ashkenazi
population. While a large proportion of the latter seized the
opportunities offered by the mass migration to move from the
working to the middle class, the new immigrants, lacking marketable
skills, advanced education and connections with the authorities,
had to accept lower paying jobs, often in marginal neighborhoods
and settlements which offered little economic promise. The effect
of this was compounded by the fact that Oriental Jews tended to
have larger families. In many homes, parents were unable to provide
necessary educational support and assistance for their children,
who lacked the space and resources needed for study. As a result,
the first generation of Israeli-born Jews of Asian and African
parents also grew up under disadvantaged circumstances.
Sadly, the socio-economic gap of the 1950s continued into the 1970s. This gap
can be seen in the areas of income, occupational distribution,
education and social influence.
Income:
During 1956-1957, Oriental Jews earned on the average only 73% of
what Jews from Europe did. By 1975 this had increased to 82%.
However, for Jews born in Israel the gap was wider: in 1969, Jews
born in Asia and Africa brought in 70% of the income of Jews born
in Europe and America, but Israeli-born children of Asian-African
parents reached only 58% of what their peers born to
European-American parents earned. After taking into consideration
the higher family size among Oriental Jews, the average per capita
income of Oriental Jews in 1969 was only 48% of that of Jews from
Europe and America. The percentage of Oriental Jews in the bottom
20% of the income scale even increased during the 1970s: in
1968-69, 30% of Oriental Jews and 12% of European-American Jews
were among the lowest income groups; in 1982 the numbers were 32%
and 9% respectively.
Occupational Distribution:
In 1954, 19.8% of Oriental Jews held white collar jobs compared to
42.9% of Jews from European-American families. By 1975, 32.2% of
Oriental Jews had entered white collar professions, but so had
57.7% of those from Europe-America. Although Jews from Asia-Africa
had made significant professional strides forward (12.4%), European
Jews had advanced even more quickly (14.8%). Polarization was most
evident at the extremities of the professional ladder: European
Jews were predominant in scientific and academic institutions while
Jews from Asia and Africa held most of the unskilled jobs.
Education:
In 1961, Oriental Jews had on the average, 64% of the education
(measured in years) of Jews from Europe and America. Although this
had increased to 72% by 1975 (still a gap of over 2 years), the
structure of Oriental Jews in the educational system resembled a
"pyramid": Oriental representation decreased as the level
increased. In 1972-73, 59.9% of primary school students came from
Oriental families. Three years later, the percentage of high school
students from an Oriental background was 49.5%. That same year,
only 14.8% of university students came from Asian-African families.
During critical years of secondary education, less children from
Oriental Jewish families attended school: during 1976-77, 53.8% of
Oriental Jews aged 14-17 attended school as compared to 70.6% of
Jews from European-American families.
Influence in Society:
During the early years of the state, the degree of power and
influence held by Oriental Jews was negligible. Even in the
mid-1970s this was the case in the media, the intellectual elite,
top positions in the private and public sectors, the World Zionist
Organization and the Israel Defense Forces. Oriental representation
in spheres of power was greater in lower ranks (for example in the
army or the civil service), weaker sectors (for example the
Histadrut as opposed to the Government) and local levels (for
example, local party branches as opposed to the party central
committee). Oriental Jews were represented more in elected than in
appointed positions. Even so, the Knesset formed in 1977 had only
12 Oriental members (10%) and the Government included only 2
representatives from an Oriental background.
Narrowing the Gap:
The continuing socio-economic gap led to violent outbreaks in the
Moroccan populated Wadi Salib quarter of Haifa in July 1959 and to
demonstrations by Oriental Jews who formed the Israeli Black
Panthers in Jerusalem during the early 1970s. In the following
years, head start programs, integration in the schools alongside
special classes for educationally disadvantaged students,
leadership programs, Project Renewal (which built up the
infrastructure of disadvantaged neighborhoods through the
cooperation of local residents with diaspora Jewish communities),
assistance to residents of Development Towns, government housing
assistance for young couples, research into the history and culture
of Oriental Jewish communities as well as an increased role of
Oriental Jews in politics, led to a considerable narrowing of the
socio-economic gap. No less important was the increasing social
acceptance of Oriental Jews among young Israelis as evidenced by
"mixed" Oriental-Ashkenazi marriages. In 1968-69, 17.4% of all
first marriages in Israel were mixed, and this figure rose to 20.3%
in 1980. By the 1990s, roughly a quarter of all new marriages were
mixed.
Income:
In 1988, the average Oriental household still earned only 82% of
what a European-American household brought in. However, primarily
due to a decline in the size of Oriental families, the average per
capita income of an Oriental family rose to 67% of that of
Ashkenazi families. The ethnic stratification remains: the poor
classes remain predominantly Oriental whereas Ashkenazi Jews
continue to from the majority of the upper classes.
Occupational Distribution:
In 1990, Jews born in Europe or America were twice as likely as
Jews born in Asia-Africa to reach the top three occupational
categories (professionals, managers and technicians). Among
Israeli-born Ashkenazim and Orientals, the gap was even greater
(49.4% compared to 20.8%). 32.4% of Israeli-born Orientals as
opposed to 12.9% of Israeli-born Ashkenazi Jews held lower class
occupations (workers in industry, mining, building, transport and
unskilled workers) in 1985.
It is at the middle class level that
greater equality can be discerned. Among the Israeli-born to
fathers from Israel, Asia-Africa and Europe-America, the
percentages in middle class occupations (clerical work, sales,
public services) for 1985 were 40.8, 44.5 and 33.5 respectively.
The proportion of Oriental and Ashkenazi Jews who become
self-employed is also similar (19% in 1981).
Education:
By the 90's, Ashkenazi Jews still received more schooling on the average than did
Orientals: in 1990 the difference stood at 1.4 years. Even today, Oriental Jews
still have a much lower rate of university education. Only 16.5% of
native born Oriental Jews as compared with 56.0% of Ashkenazi
sabras have received a college education. The gap in school
attendance has narrowed: in 1981-82 the percentage of Oriental
youth aged 14-17 that attended school was 79.2% compared with 84.2%
of children from Ashkenazi families.
It appears however, that
Oriental children often receive a lower quality of education,
probably because many lived in poorer neighborhoods and settlements
that offer less educational enrichment. Of pupils who started the
first grade in 1977-78, 25% of the Oriental and 46% of the
Ashkenazi children matriculated in 1988-89. While the poles of the
educational scale are characterized by ethnic preponderance, the
middle level is more evenly mixed. In 1985, 43.6% of sabras born to
Israeli fathers, 47.2% of Oriental sabras and 38.7% of Ashkenazi
sabras had studied for a period of between 11 and 12 years.
Influence in Society:
The victory of the Likud under Menachem Begin in the Knesset
elections of 1977, and of Netanyahu 2 decades later, demonstrated the electoral power of Oriental
Jewry which had overwhelmingly supported the Likud effort. Oriental
Jews had also been rising up through local political structures
both in party ranks and in local government. The representation of Jews from Asia-Africa
in other ruling positions has increased considerably: Oriental Jews
have served as President of the State (Yitzhak Navon), Deputy Prime
Minister (Moshe Nissim, David Levy), Foreign Minister (David Levy),
Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (Moshe Levy),
Secretary-General of the Histadrut (Yisrael Kessar, Amir Peretz),
Secretary-General of the Moshav Movement (Nissim Zvilli) and
Treasurer of the Jewish Agency (Meir Shitrit). Shas (Sephardi Torah
Guardians), a party formed by orthodox Oriental Jews during the
1980s, received 17 seats in the recent elections.
In short, one can state that the socio-economic gap, although
narrower in certain areas, continues to exist, especially in
education. This is both the result of socio-economic disparities,
and a major cause for their perpetuation.
Ethnicity and Politics:
The correlation between political and ethnic divisions tends to
focus attention on ethnic particularities. Israeli political
parties, with the exception of Shas and a few short-lived ethnic
parties, have not identified with the interests of particular
"edot". However, many Oriental Jews support the Likud and other
more hard-line parties whereas most Ashkenazim support Labor and
parties on the so-called Left. Whether this is due to ethnic
related positions on foreign policy, Arabs, territory, religion, or
social welfare; the style of party leaders in emphasizing national
solidarity or religious tradition; a tendency to blame the Labor
party for the problems of absorption in the 1950s; or the success
in reaching positions of influence within a particular party, most
Ashkenazi and Oriental Jews find themselves voting against each
other at election time.
Limits of Ethnicity in Israel
Research from 1988 shows that ethnic identity is not felt by most
Israelis to be a matter of great importance. The majority believe
that education, urban renewal and mixed marriages will resolve the
socio-economic disparities. Few endorse affirmative action in
universities or top posts, and even less advocate more radical
measures such as immigration limitation. Outside the family unit
and the realm of folklore, there seems to be little legitimacy
accorded to ethnic distinctiveness of Jews in Israel.
The overriding principle of the unity of the Jewish people is accepted
by all groups. An example of this can be seen in the celebration of
the Mimouna on the day after the Passover week. Originally a
family-centered holiday among the Jews of Morocco, the occasion has
developed in Israel into a national holiday centering on the
breaking down of cultural barriers and the promotion of national
friendship and unity. It has also become a something of a political staple,
a whistle stop for politicians seeking the Sephardi vote.
Another example can be seen in the rhetoric
and views of Oriental Jews who have reached positions in which they
could serve as a center for ethnic politics. Leaders such as David
Levy have spurned such a role and consistently present themselves
as advocates of national unity and interest. By the same token,
ethnic parties have generally failed to muster large-scale support.
Thus in spite of the continuing socio-economic gap, which may grow
even wider as a result of the large immigration from Eastern Europe
during the 1990s, and the persistent differences on the political
level, the possibility of an ethnic struggle in Israel does not
appear likely.
Sources:
- Pnina Morag-Talmon, "The Integration Processes of Eastern Jews in
Israeli Society, 1948-1988," in Peter Medding, ed., Israel: State
and Society 1948-1988. (=Studies in Contemporary Jewry 5) (New York
and Oxford: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1989): 25-38.
- Sammy Smooha, "Jewish Ethnicity in Israel," in Keith Kyle and Joel
Peters, eds., Whither Israel? The Domestic Challenges (London and
New York: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1993): 161-176, 273-276.
Questions for Discussion:
- What factors encourage ethnic struggle in Israel and what factors
impede this?
Should ethnic identities be fostered in Israel?
Background:
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, former Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel and current spiritual mentor of Shas, referred to Education Minister Yossi Sarid as Haman during one of his Saturday night addresses. When attacked for his statements, his followers claimed that they were being singled out because they were religious and because they were Sephardi victims of Ashkenazi prejudice. They rallied in front of Rabbi Yosef's home in Jerusalem to show support for him and, as the article below describes, rallied once again at the Western Wall. The current Sephardi Chief Rabbi attended the second rally.
Thousands attend pro-Yosef rally
By David Zev Harris
JERUSALEM (April 6) - Thousands attended a rally at the Western Wall in support of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef yesterday.
The rally came a day after the Shas mentor submitted evidence to the police explaining his attack on Meretz leader and Education Minister Yossi Sarid. The gathering was also an opportunity for people to offer prayers at the start of the month of Nissan. Prayers were also dedicated to the 13 Jews awaiting trial in Iran for alleged spying. Several leading rabbis joined the rally, including Sephardi Chief Rabbi Eliahu Bakshi-Doron. His participation was reportedly only sealed after Yosef's office promised there would be no political speeches.
The rally was the second major event in support of Yosef since Attorney-General Elyakim Rubinstein ordered police to investigatee if there was incitement when Yosef compared Sarid to Haman and suggested God should treat him like Amalek, the Jews' traditional enemy whom God orders completely destroyed. The next pro-Yosef demonstration will take place in Jerusalem during Pessah. Organizers hope tens of thousands will participate.
Conflict, meanwhile, has arisen between the police and the State Attorney's Office over the investigation of Yosef. The police are saying Yosef's version of events, given to Insp.-Gen. Yehuda Wilk, is sufficient, while Justice Ministry officials are demanding that he be questioned by investigators.
Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press:
(Government Press Office)
4 April 2000
- 'Yediot Ahronot' - independent (250,000)
- 'Ma'ariv' - independent (160,000)
- 'Ha'aretz' - independent (65,000)
- 'Hatzofeh' - NRP (NA)
Israeli Society & the Economic Scene:
Yediot Ahronot calls Israel "a country under siege." The country is
hostage to the myriad of strikers and the treasury lacks the tools to
determine who is merely an extortionist and who has a justifiable
complaint. The public finds it hard to understand why the Finance
Ministry calls the doctors "bribe-seekers," why 40% of civil servants
need wage supports, why so many support staff are working without
wage contracts - all of which do not point to proper public
management. The wave of strikes shows that there is no alternative to
proper and clear economic policy that respects workers and guarantees
a living wage. "After all, wasn't this the reason for the change in
government?"
Ma'ariv writes that Prime Minister Barak has, up until now, based his
optimistic economic forecasts on peace with Syria. The failure of the
Syrian talks forces a re-evaluation: From a peace government to a
socio-economic one. The ship of state must change its azimuth if it
wants to reach safe harbor. But the announcements of change "raise
more than a few questions." Only time will tell if it is real or
merely a PR ploy. Nor should one ignore the polls and the upcoming
media grading of the government's first year in office. "Barak, it
may be assumed, does not want an F in the socio-economic subjects."
Another concern is the Palestinians and the tight timetable for an
agreement which will require at least as much effort as the Syrian
track. The editors warn the "focused Barak" not to neglect the peace
process.
Yediot Ahronot, in its second editorial, writes that the new
government will soon have been in office for a full year and will
have to weigh its achievements and be graded. The public, tired of
gimmicks and corruption, voted for change. It doubts that it has
received it. There is no feeling of a new leader such as followed the
upheavals which brought the late prime ministers Menachem Begin and
Yitzhak Rabin to power. The editors note that Prime Minister Barak
said that there is no room for gimmicks in the socio-economic sphere
and add that if he wants to create genuine conditions for change he
will have to fundamentally change himself, first and foremost. "The
contract Barak made with the public was crafted by American advisors,
and his winning ace was the unemployment and economic distress,
issues previously considered to be lacking sex appeal." Polls are
showing that people are critical of his socio-economic policies and
of his insisting on working alone. He must internalize both
criticisms. Nor can he be relied upon when his coalition ministers do
not act like partners but as heads of special sectarian interests who
challenge his position. Barak must learn to delegate authority, seek
the advice of his ministers, set clear missions and demand effective
cooperation. He must also seek the cooperation of other public policy
bodies. There is no alternative to experience and knowledge.
Globes writes that two factors led to the "turn-around" in the
government's economic policy. One is the incomprehension of policy to
date; and the attempts by Public Security and Industry and Trade
ministers to wreck the current budget policy. The editors note that
"one may wonder" about the government's "apparent projects" that have
all - barring none - been in the planning stages for months. The
jubilee port for example was the very cause of the recent ports
strike and anyone talking about the Trans-Israel highway or the Negev
railway "is not following the economic press." The editors ask
whether the new economic policy is nothing more than a new PR
campaign stemming from political plight. If so, "the government had
better not degrade itself on gimmicks, but carry out its set
policies." The editors note that "Benjamin Netanyahu was a PR ace,
and that it did not exactly help him." Tax reform, capital markets
reform and pension reform are all real policies. Barak is maintaining
policies of fiscal discipline, monetary restraint and structural
reform. He has pledged public management reform as well. The editors
aver that the two aforementioned ministers' economic plan shows signs
that its proponents "may not understand its consequences." The use of
one-time tax windfalls to finance current expenses is a dead-end and
will ultimately end in budget cuts, including social ones. They will
also lead to an immediate loss of foreign investment in Israel.
Ha'aretz rejects the doctor's claim that they face wage
discrimination. Full intern wages, including supplements reveals a
rather different picture. While the Finance Ministry is willing to
agree to a wage adjustment to make up for erosion, it is correct in
rejecting a real wage hike. The resulting wage demands from other
sectors - as happened in 1994 - resulting in budgetary transgressions
and balance of payments deficit and almost caused an economic crisis.
The once and current Finance Minister Avraham Shohat should not
repeat his error. He has few non-utilized resources and must allocate
them to areas where growth is badly needed - investment in
infrastructure and job training.
Ma'ariv, in its third editorial, states that no-one, certainly not
the government, seems to care about the cost of the doctors' strike
to patients. On the other hand, the press was full of stories about
the threat which Interior Ministry employees' sanctions may pose to
basketball fans who would like to attend a key game in Greece next
week: "A quick lesson in priorities."