The Introduction
Nature (the art whereby God hath made and governs the world) is by the
art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated: that it
can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a motion of limbs,
the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why may we not
say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs
and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart
but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but
so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended
by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most
excellent work of nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN
called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE (in Latin CIVITAS) which is but an artificial
man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose
protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty
is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole
body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature
and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment
(by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member
is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the
body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular
members are the strength; Salus Populi (the people’s
safety) is its business; counselors, by whom all things
needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity
and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition,
sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts
and covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politic were at
first made, set together and united, resemble that fiat, or the
Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
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Chapter XIII.
Of the NATURAL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and
Misery.
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind, as
that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body,
or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together, the
difference between man and man is not so considerable, as that one man
can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend
as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength
enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others that are in the same danger with himself.
And as to the faculties of the mind (setting aside the arts grounded upon
words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible
rules, called Science – which very few have, and but in few things,
as being not a native faculty born with us, nor attained (as Prudence,)
while we look after somewhat else) I find yet a greater equality amongst
men than that of strength. For prudence is but experience, which equal
time equally bestows on all men in those things they equally apply themselves
unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain
concept of one’s own wisdom, which almost all men think they have
in a greater degree than the Vulgar – that is, than all men but
themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves,
they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge
many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they
will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see
their own wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance. But this proveth
rather that men are in that point equal, than unequal. For there is not
ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of any thing, than
that every man is contented with his share.
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So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel.
First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first maketh
men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.
The first use violence to make themselves masters of other men’s
persons, wives, children, and chattel; the second, to defend them; the
third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other
sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflexion in
their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their
name.
Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called ‘war’,
and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR consisteth
not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein
the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the
nature of weather.
For as the nature of foul weather lyeth not in a shower or two of rain
but in an inclination thereto of many days together, so the nature of
war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time
is PEACE.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is
enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live
without other security than what their own strength, and their own invention,
shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry,
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of
the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported
by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing
such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth;
no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst
of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
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Chapter XIV
Of the first and second NATURAL LAWS, and of CONTRACTS
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the
liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the
preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life; and consequently
of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason he shall conceive
to be the aptest means thereunto.
By LIBERTY is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take
away part of a man’s power to do what he would, but cannot hinder
him from using the power left him according as his judgment and reason
shall dictate to him.
A LAW OF NATURE, lex naturalis, is a precept or general rule found out
by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive
of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit
that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For, though they that
speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex, ‘right’
and ‘law,’ yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT
consisteth in liberty to do or to forbear, whereas LAW determineth and
bindeth to one of them; so that law and right differ as much as obligation
and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent
chapter, is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which
case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he
can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life
against his enemies, it followeth that in such a condition every man has
a right to everything, even to one another’s body. And therefore,
as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth, there
can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living
out the time which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently
it is a precept or general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavour
peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and, when he cannot obtain
it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first
branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of Nature,
which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right
of Nature, which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves.
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The mutual transferring of right is that which men call CONTRACT.
There is difference between transferring of right to the thing and transferring,
or tradition that is delivery of the thing itself. For the thing may be
delivered together with the translation of the right, as in buying and
selling with ready money, or exchange of goods or lands, and it may be
delivered some time after.
Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on
his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate
time after, and in the meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his
part is called PACT, or COVENANT; or both parts may contract now to perform
hereafter; in which cases he that is to perform in time to come, being
trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith, and the
failing of performance, if it be voluntary, violation of faith.
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If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently
but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition
of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable suspicion,
it is void; but, if there be a common power set over them both with right
and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that
performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because
the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice,
anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power, which
in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and judges of
the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And, therefore,
he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary
to the right he can never abandon, of defending his life and means of
living.
But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those
that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable,
and for that cause he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged
so to do.
The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always
something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact or other sign
of the will not to perform; else it cannot make the covenant void. For
that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted
as a hindrance of performing.
He that transferreth any right transferreth the means of enjoying it as
far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land is understood to transfer
the herbage and whatsoever grows upon it; nor can he that sells a mill
turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the right
of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying
money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration
of justice.
To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because, not understanding
our speech, they understand not nor accept of any translation of right;
nor can translate any right to another; and without mutual acceptation,
there is no covenant.
To make covenant with God is impossible, but by mediation of such as God
speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural or by His lieutenants that
govern under Him and in His name; for otherwise we know not whether our
covenants be accepted or not. And therefore they that vow anything contrary
to any law of Nature vow in vain, as being a thing unjust to pay such
a vow. And, if it be a thing commanded by the law of Nature, it is not
the vow but the law that binds them.
The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under
deliberation (for to covenant is an act of the will; that is to say an
act, and the last act, of deliberation), and is therefore always understood
to be something to come, and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth
to perform.
And therefore to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant.
But, if that prove impossible afterwards which before was thought possible,
the covenant is valid and bindeth, though not to the thing itself, yet
to the value, or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour
of performing as much as is possible, for to more no man can be obliged.
Men are freed of their covenants two ways: by performing, or by being
forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness
the restitution of liberty, as being a retransferring of that right in
which the obligation consisted.
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Chapter XXI
Of the Liberty of Subjects
LIBERTY, or FREEDOM, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by
opposition, I mean external impediments of motion); and may be applied
no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational. For whatsoever
is so tied, or environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space,
which space is determined by the opposition of some external body, we
say it hath not liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures,
whilst they are imprisoned, or restrained with walls or chains; and of
the water whilst it is kept in by banks or vessels that otherwise would
spread itself into a larger space; we use to say they are not at liberty
to move in such manner as without those external impediments they would.
But when the impediment of motion is in the constitution of the thing
itself, we use not to say it wants the liberty, but the power, to move;
as when a stone lieth still, or a man is fastened to his bed by sickness.
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Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water that hath not only
liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so, likewise in
the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed their
will, proceed from liberty, and yet because every act of man's will and
every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from
another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of
God, the first of all causes), proceed from necessity. So that to him
that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all men's
voluntary actions would appear manifest. And therefore God, that seeth
and disposeth all things, seeth also that the liberty of man in doing
what he will is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which God
will and no more, nor less. For though men may do many things which God
does not command, nor is therefore author of them; yet they can have no
passion, nor appetite to anything, of which appetite God's will is not
the cause. And did not His will assure the necessity of man's will, and
consequently of all that on man's will dependeth, the liberty of men would
be a contradiction and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of God.
And this shall suffice, as to the matter in hand, of that natural liberty,
which only is properly called liberty.
But as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves
thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a Commonwealth; so
also have they made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves,
by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man,
or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power, and at the other
to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless
be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking
them.
Source: Thomas Hobbes Leviathan, Cambridge University
Press.