Sabra & Shatilla,
The Kahan Commission
And Belgium

1. Introductory Note
2. Up-Front Facts
3. FAQ on Sabra & Shatilla, the Kahan Commission and Belgium
4. Best of the Web - related articles and documents for reference
5. Postscript: Storm in a Teacup?

Introductory Note

Israeli advocates find themselves once again confronting a thesis that runs from "ridiculous ad absurdum", reaching its apex in a kind of surrealistic scenario, where nu-speak and trendy politically correct language combine to distort any semblance of the truth. The equation to resolve this lose-lose game does exist, and the essential aims are to expose the unjust basis of the allegations against Ariel Sharon and other figures, by providing context, while also turning this around and exposing the clear political motives behind the Belgian litigation as a highly sophisticated con of the public and the legal world.

Firstly, one needs to replace the media spin environment with historical facts and evidence, or remain at psychological disadvantage. There is no basis to any allegations of "war crimes" against Ariel Sharon - the most meticulous examination of the extensive evidence by the Kahan Commission - an independent judicial Commission of Inquiry - points in another direction, entirely. We bring the main findings of the Inquiry: they are searching and indisputable.

Secondly, it is vital to demonstrate that this is no innocent or altruistic move, but a trumped up case for political and media puropses. Moreover, Belgium grants itself total immunity from its own laws, having rejected litigation on cases such as Belgian atrocities in Rwanda and not initiated any litigation on its earlier history, or other international cases.

The background to the Belgian ruling is thus doubly a "web of deceipt" of the most predatory kind, biased in every way - and there is a great deal that must be said on this deliberate distorsion of the truth and perversion of justice.

Up-Front Facts

1. Israel established the Kahan Commission of Inquiry less than two weeks after the Sabra and Shatilla massacres occurred and the Commission dedicated itself to reconstructing the sequence of events from every possible angle, in order to draw comrehensive and comprehensible conclusions.
2. The Commission's investigations is all the more exemplary, since there have been numerous other inter-ethnic and inter-religious massacres in Lebanon, especially since 1975, none of which were investigated at any level, nor were any indictments brought in any court, or on any instance.
3. There were no allegations that Israel was involved or implicated in the Sabra & Shatilla massacres and the Kahan Commission established unequivocally that none of the witnesses was directly responsible or an accomplice to these atrocities; it did attribute "indirect responsibility" and "chain of command" accountability at a "personal" level.
4. Those deemed to have been personally, albeit indirectly, accountable through "chain of command" were singled out with recommendations that they be relieved of their positions, without benefit of referral to judicial instances, and these recommendations were fully implemented.
5. The fact that Belgium has awarded itself supra-national and retrospective jurisdiction, deliberately extending this to "unconnected" cases for this purpose is more than a legal anomaly. It is highly irregular and should be brought to international deliberation as an infringement of human rights by states with territorial sovereignty, because it allows states to engage the law against anyone for political purposes
6. The proposed Belgian litigation is both unsound in terms of substance (Israel's responsibility) and the causal contention that Israel did not undertake judicial investigation of the events.

3. FAQ on Sabra & Shatilla, the Kahan Commission and Belgium

1. What was the Kahan Commission?

An extensive, independent, judicial inquiry appointed by the Israeli Cabinet to investigate responsibility for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in the late active phase of the Lebanon War. Appointed on 28th September, 1982, it reported back on 8th February, 1983.
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ign0

2. What was the Kahan Commission supposed to do?

The Israeli Cabinet phrased the remit as follows: "to investigate all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity which was carried out by a unit of the Lebanese Forces* against the civilian population of the Shatilla and Sabra camps."

The period under scrutiny was the time between Thursday, 16 September 1982, and Saturday, 18 September 1982. The Commission was an extensive operation and it held 60 sessions, hearing 58 witnesses.

*Inquiry note: "The expression "Lebanese Forces" refers to an armed force known by the name "Phalangists" or "Ketaib" (henceforth, Phalangists)."

3. Can you summarize its findings?

The hearings and findings went beyond the establishment of the atrocity in its search for "facts and factors connected with the atrocity", which they established as the direct and sole responsibility of the Phalange, detailing the times and all forms of reporting. They did not find any direct responsibility was attributable to Israelis in position in Lebanon, or in Israel. They did establish indirect and ministerial responsibility for lack of consideration, caution, preventive measures and inadequate reporting - and recommended personal consequences.

Editorial Summary on http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ign0 :

"The Commission determined that the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla was carried out by a Phalangist unit, acting on its own but its entry was known to Israel. No Israeli was directly responsible for the events which occurred in the camps.

But the Commission asserted that Israel had indirect responsibility for the massacre since the I.D.F. held the area, Mr. Begin was found responsible for not exercising greater involvement and awareness in the matter of introducing the Phalangists into the camps. Mr. Sharon was found responsible for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge when he approved the entry of the Phalangists into the camps as well as not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed. Mr. Shamir erred by not taking action after being alerted by communications Minister Zippori. Chief of Staff Eitan did not give the appropriate orders to prevent the massacre.

The Commission recommended that the Defense Minister resign, that the Director of Military Intelligence not continue in his post and other senior officers be removed. "

4. Was any specific background established to the massacres?

Lebanon was engaged in an internecine war between Christians and Palestinian terrorists, which completely destroyed the existing governmental balance between Marronite Christians and Moslems. One of the fighting methods was massacres of innocent civilians, who were non-combattant. From a chaotic succession of attacks, major fighting forces were established in each constituency.

"In 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon. This war began with clashes in Sidon between the Christians and Palestinian terrorists and subsequently widened in a manner to encompass many diverse armed forces - under the auspices of ethnic groups, political parties, and various organizations - that were active in Lebanon. In its early stages, this war was waged primarily between the Christian organizations on the one hand, and Palestinian terrorists, Lebanese leftist organizations, and Muslim and Druze organizations of various factions on the other. In the course of the civil war, Syrian army forces entered Lebanon and took part in the war, for a certain period of time on the side of the Christian forces, and subsequently on the side of the terrorists and the Lebanese leftist organizations. During the early years of the war, massacres on a large scale were perpetrated by the fighting forces against the civilian population. The Christian city of Damour was captured and destroyed by Palestinian terrorists in January 1976. The Christian residents fled the city, and the conquering forces carried out acts of slaughter that cost the lives of many Christians. In August 1976, the Christian forces captured the Tel Zaatar refugee camp in Beirut, where Palestinian terrorists had dug in, and thousands of Palestinian refugees were massacred. Each massacre brought in its wake acts of revenge of a similar nature. The number of victims of the civil war has been estimated at close to 100,000 killed, including a large number of civilians, among them women and children.

The Palestinians' armed forces organized and entrenched themselves in camps inhabited by refugees who had arrived in Lebanon in various waves, beginning in 1948. There are various estimates as to the number of Palestinian refugees who were living in Lebanon in 1982. According to the figures of U.N.R.W.A. (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency), the Palestinian refugees numbered approximately 270,000. On the other hand, the leaders of the Christian armed forces estimated the number of Palestinian refugees at approximately 500,000 or more. This estimate is most probably exaggerated, and the more realistic estimate is the one that puts the number of Palestinian refugees at approximately 300,000 - and in any case, not more than 400,000.

The main Christian armed force that took part in the civil war consisted mainly of Maronite Christians, though a small number of Shiites joined them. This force comprised several armed Christian organizations, the largest among them being the organizations under the leadership of the Chamoun family and of the Jemayel family. The head of the Jemayel family, Mr. Pierre Jemayel, founded the Phalangist organization; and the leader of this organization in recent years was Pierre's son, Bashir Jemayel. In the course of time, the Phalangist organization became the central element in the Christian forces; in 1982, the Phalangists ruled the Christian armed forces."

5. Why was Israel in Lebanon?

There had been previous problems with terrorist activity into Israel from Lebanon, but since the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, matters had been escalating. A large area north of the Israel-Lebanese border became a hotbed of terrorist activity, run by Fatah, and Israel's population was under direct threat from Katyusha rockets, attempted infiltration, etc. Indeed, the area was termed "Fatahland".

On 6th June 1982, the Israeli Government decided to send the IDF into Lebanon to remove this threat, in what became a long, drawn-out embroilment. It was not long before the Syrians, for whom Lebanon was a political satellite, also sent in troops, who took over West Beirut (the shore side). The international community intervened to prevent direct confrontation between Israel and Syria and remove them from Lebanon.

From the Kahan Commission report:

"On 12-14 June, J.D.F. forces took over the suburbs of Beirut and linked up with the Christian forces who controlled East Beirut. On 25 June the encirclement of West Beirut was completed and I.D.F. forces were in control of the Beirut-Damascus road.

There followed a period of approximately one and a half months of negotiations on the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces from West Beirut, and during this time various targets in West Beirut were occasionally shelled and bombed by the I.D.F.'s Air Force and artillery.

On 19.8.82 the negotiations on the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces from West Beirut were completed.

On 23.8.82 Bashir Jemayel was elected president of Lebanon. His term of office was supposed to begin on 23 September 1982.

On 21-26 August, a multi-national force arrived in Beirut, and the evacuation of the terrorists and the Syrian forces began."

Israel was intensively involved in Lebanon until 1985; it remained in the "Security Zone" until May 2000; Syria remains and retains controlling interests in Lebanon to this day, including through its support of terrorist organizations.

6. The Belgian indictment contends that Israel was responsible, aided and planned the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla. Is that true?

Untrue: the massacre was planned by Elie Houbeika, a Syrian Intelligence agent in the Phalange and carried out by the Phalangists in the camps, with his knowledge and encouragement, unknown to Israeli officers at the forward position.

Israeli officers and figures had nothing to do with planning, assisting or carrying out the massacre, but the Kahan Commission found them "indirectly responsible" for not fulfilling their responsibility in supervisory and other capacities as an occupying force responsible for the protection of civilians, in that it was remiss by not being forward-looking, or evaluating, exploring and reporting suspicious information upwards and across the commands - and the report details the basic logistical support they provided, which unwittingly assisted the Phalange in their slaughter of civilians.

7. Who were the Phalange and why were they involved?

They were the largely Christian forces in the Civil War, led by the politically prominent Jemayel family and engaged in internecine civil war with the Syrian-supported Palestinian terrorist forces and other left-wing forces. Each side was trying to take over territory and clear out civilian population belonging to the other side, and massacre was one of the methods they both used.

From the Kahan Commission report:

"Even though the "Lebanese Forces" formally comprised several Christian organizations, the dominant and primary force in this organization, at the time under our scrutiny, was the Phalangists, led by the Jemayel family."

"At the head of this general staff [ed: Phalangist] was a commander named Fadi Frem; at the head of the Phalangists' intelligence division was a commander by the name of Elie Hobeika."

..."On Tuesday afternoon, 14.9.82, a large bomb exploded in a building in Ashrafiyeh, Beirut, where Bashir Jemayel was [meeting] with a group of commanders and other Phalangists. "

... " Word of Bashir's death reached Israel at about 11.00 p.m., and it was then that the decision was taken in conversations between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense and between the Prime Minister and the Chief of Staff - that the I.D.F. would enter West Beirut. In one of the consultations between the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, there was mention of including the Phalangists in the entry into West Beirut. The question of including the Phalangists was not mentioned at that stage in conversations with the Prime Minister."

... "I.D.F. entry into West Beirut began during the early morning hours of 15.9.82."

"After the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Jemayel [Editor: by Palestinian terrorists], tensions were high in Beirut; the US wanted Israel to pull out altogether."

8. What was the sequence of events in the camps and how many people were killed?

The Inquiry established the military orders given by the IDF and a time frame before and during the Phalange entry (at 18:00) into the camps on Thursday, 16 September 1982 until Saturday. Ostensibly, the Phalange went in to clear out the terrorists and enter combat, if they resisted. Attacks on 300 terrorists and civilians were definitely carried out by at least one of the two Phalangist groups between 18:00 and 20:00 on Thursday. This continued overnight, into Friday and the details remain sketchy, up to a rounding up of medical staff. The Phalange did not leave the camps on Saturday at 05:00, as ordered by Israeli officers, but they were then compelled to do so and left by 08:00.

"We cannot rule out the possibility that various reports included also victims of combat operations from the period antedating the assassination of Bashir. Taking into account the fact that Red Cross personnel counted no more that 328 bodies, it would appear that the number of victims of the massacre was not as high as a thousand, and certainly not thousands."
"According to I.D.F. intelligence sources, the number of victims of the massacre is between 700 and 800 (testimony of the director of Military Intelligence, pp. 139-140). "

The Sequence of Events:

Orders:

"Order number 6 was issued on the morning of 16.9.82. The first five orders said nothing about entering the refugee camps, and only in Order Number 6 were the following things stated (clause 2, document no. 6, exhibit 14):
"The refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists/ Lebanese Army."
"Clause 7 of the same order also states that the Lebanese Army "is entitled to enter any place in Beirut, according to its request."

Setting

"Brigadier-General Yaron spoke with the Phalangists about the places where the terrorists were located in the camps and also warned them not to harm the civilian population."
"The Phalangist unit that was supposed to enter the camps was an intelligence unit headed, as we have said, by Elie Hobeika. Hobeika did not go into the camps with his unit and was on the roof of the forward command post during the night (testimony of Brigadier-General Yaron, p. 726)."

... Supervision

"On Thursday, 16.9.82, at approximately 18:00 hours, members of the Phalangists entered the Shatilla camp from the west and south. They entered in two groups, and once they had passed the battery surrounding the camps their movements within the camps were not visible from the roof of the forward command post or from the observation sites on other roofs. The Divisional Intelligence Officer tried to follow their movements using binoculars which he shifted from place to place, but was unable to see their movements or their actions."

Reports

"According to Lt. Elul's testimony, while he was on the roof of the forward command post, next to the Phalangists' communications set, he heard a Phalangist officer from the force that had entered the camps tell Elie Hobeika (in Arabic) that there were 50 women and children, and what should he do. Elie Hobeika's reply over the radio was: "This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that, you know exactly what to do;" and then raucous laughter broke out among the Phalangist personnel on the roof. Lieutenant Elul understood that what was involved was the murder of the women and children. According to his testimony, Brigadier General Yaron, who was also on the forward command post roof then, asked him what he had overheard on the radio; and after Lieutenant Elul told him the content of the conversation, Brigadier General Yaron went over to Hobeika and spoke with him in English for about five minutes (for Lt. Elul's testimony, see pp. 1209-1210a). Lt. Elul did not hear the conversation between Brigadier General Yaron and Hobeika."

"As noted, the report which the Intelligence Officer obtained originated in a conversation held over the radio with Elie Hobeika. Although both reports referred to a group of 45-50 persons, and it is, not to be ruled out that the questions asked over the radios referred to the same group of persons, it is clear, both from the fact that the replies given were different in content - the reply of the liaison officer was to do with the group of people as God commands, while Hobeika's reply was different - that two different conversations took place regarding the fate of the people who had fallen into the Phalangists' hands."

"An additional report relating to the actions of the Phalangists in the camps vis-a-vis the civilians there came from liaison officer G. of the Phalangists. When he entered the dining room in the forward command post building at approximately 8:00 p.m., that liaison officer told various people that about 300 persons had been killed by the Phalangists, among them also civilians. He stated this in the presence of many I.D.F. officers who were there, including Brigadier General Yaron. We had different versions of the exact wording of this statement by Phalangist officer G., but from all the testimony we have heard it is clear that he said that as a result of the Phalangists' operations up to that time, 300 terrorists and civilians had been killed in the camps. Shortly thereafter, Phalangist officer G. returned to the dining room and amended his earlier report by reducing the number of casualties from 300 to 120."

"Between approximately 22:00 hours and 23:00 hours the Divisional Intelligence Officer contacted Northern Command, spoke with the Deputy Intelligence Officer there, asked if Northern Command had received any sort of report, was told in reply that there was no report, and told the Deputy Intelligence officer of Northern Command about the Phalangist officer's report concerning 300 terrorists and civilians who had been killed, and about the amendment to that report whereby the number of those killed was only 120."

"Brigadier-General Yaron did not inform Major-General Drori of the reports which had reached him on Thursday evening regarding the actions of the Phalangists vis-a-vis non-combatants in the camps, and reports about aberrations did not reach Major-General Drori until Friday, 17.9.82, in the morning hours."

"In the early hours of that morning a note lay on a table in the Northern Command situation room in Aley. The note read as follows:

"During the night the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. Even though it was agreed that they would not harm civilians, they 'butchered.' "

"... the cable report (appendix exhibit 29) regarding 300 killed reached the office of the director of Military Intelligence on 17.9.82 at 5:30 a.m. The text of this cable was transmitted to the director of Military Intelligence at his home in a morning report at 6:15 a.m..."

..."In concluding the description of the events of Thursday and Friday, it should be noted that no information on the reports which had arrived during those two days regarding the Phalangists' deeds, as these were detailed above, was given to the Prime Minister during those same two days."

Meeting the Phalange, Friday

"At about 16:00 hours, the meeting between the Chief of Staff and the Phalangist staff was held. "

"It is clear from all the testimony that no explicit question was posed to the Phalangist commanders concerning the rumors or reports which had arrived until then regarding treatment of the civilian population in the camps. The Phalangist commanders, for their part, didn't "volunteer" any reports of this type, and this matter was therefore not discussed at all at that meeting. The subject of the Phalangists' conduct toward those present in the camps did not come up at all at that meeting, nor was there any criticism or warning on this matter."

Journalist and other reports

Journalist Zeev Schiff questioned the Chief of Staff at Beirut airport on Friday afternoon, about reports he had heard.

"At 23:30 hours, Mr. BenYishai [ Ed: military correspondent] called up the Defense Minister and told him that a story was circulating that the Phalangists were doing unacceptable things in the camps."

The US had received reports, too and contacted the Israel Foreign Ministry:

"The Foreign Ministry personnel handled these complaints, and a summary of them was also sent to the situation room at the Defense Ministry and was brought to the Defense Minister's attention at approximately 22:00 hours."

9. Was Israel involved or complicit in the massacres?

No, not in any way. They weren't inside the camps, they didn't conspire with the Phalange and had no prior knowledge of Phalange plans.

"Direct Responsibility"

"Our conclusion is therefore that the direct responsibility for the perpetration of the acts of slaughter rests on the Phalangist forces. No evidence was brought before us that Phalangist personnel received explicit orders from their command to perpetrate acts of slaughter, but it is evident that the forces who entered the area were steeped in hatred for the Palestinians, in the wake of the atrocities and severe injuries done to the Christians during the civil war in Lebanon by the Palestinians and those who fought alongside them; and these feelings of hatred were compounded by a longing for revenge in the wake of the assassination of the Phalangists' admired leader Bashir and the killing of several dozen Phalangists two days before their entry into the camps. The execution of acts of slaughter was approved for the Phalangists on the site by the remarks of the two commanders to whom questions were addressed over the radios, as was related above."

... "Following the massacre, the Phalangist commanders denied, in various interviews in the media, that they had perpetrated the massacre. "

... " According to the above description of events, all the evidence indicates that the massacre was perpetrated by the Phalangists between the time they entered the camps on Thursday, 16.9.82,. at 18:00 hours, and their departure from the camps on Saturday, 18.9.82, at approximately 8:00 a.m. The victims were found in those areas where the Phalangists were in military control during the aforementioned time period. No other military force aside from the Phalangists was seen by any one of the witnesses in the area of the camps where the massacre was carried out, or at the time of the entrance into or exit from this area."

"Here and there, hints, and even accusations, were thrown out to the effect that I.D.F. soldiers were in the camps at the time the massacre was perpetrated. We have no doubt that these notions are completely groundless and constitute a baseless libel. "

... "We have already determined above that events in the camps, in the area where the Phalangists entered, were not visible from the roof of the forward command post. It has also been made clear that no sounds from which it could be inferred that a massacre was being perpetrated in the camps reached that place."

... "Contentions and accusations were advanced that even if I.D.F. personnel had not shed the blood of the massacred, the entry of the Phalangists into the camps had been carried out with the prior knowledge that a massacre would be perpetrated there and with the intention that this should indeed take place; and therefore all those who had enabled the entry of the Phalangists into the camps should be regarded as accomplices to the acts of slaughter and sharing in direct responsibility. These accusations too are unfounded. We have no doubt that no conspiracy or plot was entered into between anyone from the Israeli political echelon or from the military echelon in the I.D.F. and the Phalangists, with the aim of perpetrating atrocities in the camps."

10. What does Israel's "indirect responsibility" mean?

That due care and caution might have changed the outcomes and that officers and officials are held accountable and must to take the professional consequences, if they are not meticulous in performance of their duties.

"To sum up this chapter, we assert that the atrocities in the refugee camps were perpetrated by members of the Phalangists, and that absolutely no direct responsibility devolves upon Israel or upon those who acted in its behalf. At the same time, it is clear from what we have said above that the decision on the entry of the Phalangists into the refugee camps was taken without consideration of the danger - which the makers and executors of the decision were obligated to foresee as probable - that the Phalangists would commit massacres and pogroms against the inhabitants of the camps, and without an examination of the means for preventing this danger. Similarly, it is clear from the course of events that when the reports began to arrive about the actions of the Phalangists in the camps, no proper heed was taken of these reports, the correct conclusions were not drawn from them, and no energetic and immediate actions were taken to restrain the Phalangists and put a stop to their actions. This both reflects and exhausts Israel's indirect responsibility for what occurred in the refugee camps. "

but ...:

"In our view, everyone who had anything to do with events in Lebanon should have felt apprehension about a massacre in the camps, if armed Phalangist forces were to be moved into them without the I.D.F. exercising concrete and effective supervision and scrutiny of them. All those concerned were well aware that combat morality among the various combatant groups in Lebanon differs from the norm in the I.D.F. that the combatants in Lebanon belittle the value of human life far beyond what is necessary and accepted in wars between civilized peoples, and that various atrocities against the non-combatant population had been widespread in Lebanon since 1975. It was well known that the Phalangists harbor deep enmity for the Palestinians, viewing them as the source of all the troubles that afflicted Lebanon during the years of the civil war. The fact that in certain operations carried out under close I.D.F. supervision the Phalangists did not deviate from disciplined behavior could not serve as an indication that their attitude toward the Palestinian population had changed, or that changes had been effected in their plans - which they made no effort to hide - for the Palestinians."[Editor: also a reference to Mossad opinion - that the Phalange were reliable - and Military Intelligence/common knowledge - that they were not.]

and:

"a member of the Cabinet is responsible to the elected assembly for all the administrative actions of the apparatus within his ministry, even if he was not initially aware of them and was not a party to them." [See: Agranat Commission, Section 30 - on the Yom Kippur War]

11. So why is the Belgian counsel - and Human Rights Watch - seeking to bring Sharon to trial, - rather than the Phalange and Houbeika?

There are several major issues here and they all boil down to the fact that Ariel Sharon is a political hot potato as a Head of State and there are distinct, vested political interests at stake. These are all points to be made:

1. The goal isn't justice, it's political and media capital - anti-Israel sentiment, included - and a good way of continuing to demonize Israel internationally, especially in prestigious legal and diplomatic circles.
2. The plaintiffs claim they seek financial compensation - there would be little point in trying to prosecute the Phalange or Houbeika for those purposes! In any case, Houbeika was liquidated only relatively recently - at the Syrians' behest!
3. As a test case of the 1993 law and its amendment to cover "unconnected" cases (supranational jurisdiction), it diverts attention from ongoing investigation of Belgian atrocities in the Congo up to 1960, plus a more recently rejected case on Rwanda, although the Belgian atrocities in Rwanda (1990) and Somalia (1993) have not been entered into litigation.
4. Belgium and Brussels have a large, anti-Israel constituency, manipulating the 1993 Belgian law on retrospective prosecution of war criminals and its more recent (highly politicized) amendment - and they have the money to do so - so this is not a true separation of legislative and judiciary at all! That again, makes it a political case, not a legal one.
5. Belgium appears to be trying to pull the carpet out from under the UN's new supranational, International Criminal Court at the Hague, which is the natural forum for a war crimes case, but which does not have retrospective juridical powers.
6. Belgium is the seat of the European Union and has come into the open as virulently anti-American in its position on Iraq, NATO support for Turkey; in the past, the EU was reluctant to assist in Bosnia, too, which is right next door in the Balkans.

12. The UK "Independent" newspaper wrote that Ariel Sharon was found "personally" responsible for the massacres and the BBC Panorama broadcast also put this line - is this true, and why wasn't something done about it?

The Kahan Commission established "indirect responsibility" only for the Israelis investigated, but attributed "personal" responsibility, particularly to Sharon, through "chain of command" - as the person accountable for the military in the government echelons, for the decision to send the Phalange into the camps and for not reporting it to the Prime Minister. The buck stopped there: the Inquiry recommended that Sharon be removed from his position as Minister of Defense, and that was what happened.

"It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged."

Panorama's Fergal Keane has a particular political agenda and his past allegiances wouldn't bear close scrutiny. It was a highly sensational translation of interviews with prominent figures into a case against Sharon.

13. Can you be more explicit about the "chain of command" problems?

Decisions were made, or appropriate decisions were not made at an operational and local level, without proper evaluation and without supplying all the information to senior personnel about what was known - information which could have materially changed those decisions. Therefore,e some decisions requiring higher authority were made without informing the higher authority - which, in turn, was not always scrutinizing operations in the manner it should have been. Subsequently, as reports and information came in, they were not checked, nor were they transmitted up the command in the proper manner.

"... the importance of the decision on the entry of the Phalangists, against the backdrop of the Lebanese situation as it was known to those concerned, required that the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps be made with the prior approval of the Prime Minister. "

"Second, once the decision was taken, orderly processes of government required that the Prime Minister be informed of any excesses committed. " "Orderly processes require that the decision on the ent

ry of the Phalangists be reported in an orderly and documented manner to the various bodies that should know about it, so that they can direct their activities and assessments accordingly."

14. How does this apply to Division Commander, Brigadier General Amos Yaron?

Yaron was dismissed from his position and cashiered. This is probably the same kind of verdict a Court Martial would have rendered, but he was not actually tried judicially.

"The first issue specified in the notice sent to Brigadier General Amos Yaron under section 15(A) of the law is that Brigadier General Yaron did not properly evaluate and did not check reports that reached him concerning acts of killing and other irregular actions of the Phalangists in the camps, did not pass on that information to the G.O.C. and to the Chief of Staff immediately after it had been received on 16.9.82, and did not take the appropriate steps to stop the Phalangists' actions and to protect the population in the camps immediately upon receiving the reports."

15. What about the Mossad's involvement in actual events?

The complete report is not available to the public and the published version appears to exclude detailed references to the Mossad in the investigation - but there were no personal and disciplinary recommendations in the Inquiry.

The Commission does make the point that ,while the operational policies with the Phalange in Lebanon were guided by the Mossad's experience in the field and by their men on the spot - to the effect that the Phalange did not present a threat to civilians -, Military Intelligence held a contrary opinion, one which was neither put definitively, nor transmitted higher. In the final outcome, it was the Director of Military Intelligence on the spot who was reprimanded, not the Mossad, because inadequate reporting procedures handicapped the chain of command. On reflection, this seems to be either an anomaly - or an omission.

16. What about Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan?

He was found to be in breach of duty for not foreseeing problems, or taking steps to avoid harm to the civilian population.

"The absence of a warning from experts cannot serve as an explanation for ignoring the danger of a massacre. The Chief of Staff should have known and foreseen - by virtue of common knowledge, as well as the special information at his disposal - that there was a possibility of harm to the population in the camps at the hands of the Phalangists. Even if the experts did not fulfill their obligation, this does not absolve the Chief of Staff of responsibility."

"It has been argued by the Chief of Staff, and in his behalf, that appropriate steps were taken to avoid the danger. A similar claim has been made by Major General Drori and Brigadier General Yaron. In our opinion, this claim is unfounded."

"We find that the Chief of Staff did not consider the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed being perpetrated against the population of the refugee camps in Beirut; he did not order the adoption of the appropriate steps to avoid this danger; and his failure to do so is tantamount to a breach of duty that was incumbent upon the Chief of Staff."

17. Was the Kahan Commission aware that there might be legal consequences to its investigations and findings?

The Commission established direct responsibility for the massacres, but these figures were outside its jurisdiction. Thus, it did not address issues of charges or indictments against them.

In connection with the conduct of Israelis on the scene, or in positions of responsibility, it issued sub-poena notices to 9 witnesses, with cautions that their evidence might compromise them. Yet it did not recommend legal proceedings against any of those indirectly implicated in the events, only administrative measures, or "personal consequences".

However, these are the final words of the public report and worth quoting:

"We do not deceive ourselves that the results of this inquiry will convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consciences, but this inquiry was not intended for such people. We have striven and have spared no effort to arrive at the truth, and we hope that all persons of good will who will examine the issue without prejudice will be convinced that the inquiry was conducted without any bias."

Best of the Web:

The Kahan Commission: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the events at the refugee camps in Beirut, 8 February 1983
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0ign0

From Israel to Damascus, Robert Hatem, Houbeika's bodyguard (online book of testimony) http://www.israeltodamascus.com/

A Belgian obsession, Evelyn Gordon, The Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2003 http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JPArticle/PrinterFull&cid=1045455712499

Trying to Try Sharon, Linda A. Malone, October 11, 2001 Middle East Report Online http://www.merip.org/mero/mero101101.html

Belgium's Dangerous Interference, article by dignitary Nagi N: Najjar:
http://www.free-lebanon.com/LFPNews/Belgium/belgium.html

Petition to King Albert II of Belgium and the Belgian Government http://www.petitiononline.com/FRAN002H/petition.html

French -
http://www.proche-orient.info/xjournal_pol_der_heure.php3?id_article=9628

Postscript: Storm in a Teacup?

For some or all of the reasons given, but primarily due to potential diplomatic implications for Belgium in its relations with the United States, the Belgian legislation on the prosecution of international war criminals has been amended.

To recap, the law passed in 1993 allowed prosecutions of any war criminals in the Belgian courts (and not in a special, or international court). Its first ruling in June 1991 was on Rwandan war criminals and this led immediately to a case being brought against Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, which went back and forth in terms of its powers of jurisdiction, with serious implications for a number of Israeli figures. Other pertinent cases were not brought to the court's attention, which added to the impressions of partiality, or worse.

However, on the eve of the US-led war on Iraq, seven relatives of Iraqis killed in the 1991 Gulf War brought a case against Colin Powell and former President George Bush (senior), for alleged war crimes in that war. Lawyer Jean-Maire Dermagne was highly specific about the political message of the case he filed. The world drew in its breath...

At this point, the Belgians appear to have opted for international discretion, with Senator Destexhe saying that these provisions were only intended to provide justice for crimes committed in countries without "democratic credentials", or provisions for "fair trial" - and the amendment covers this item, while referring all allegations of war crimes elsewhere back to the countries concerned. As it has now been passed both by the Belgian House of Representatives and the Senate, it has become law.

Senator Destexhe claims that the law was the outcome of a humanitarian campaign, to target "mass murderers", "not democratic countries" and that it was "abused and perverted ...", being used "as a political tool, rather than as a judicial instrument." The development of the scenarios as they took place, however, tells a different story: the intentions of the legislation were clear, while the implications were overlooked, at best. Had the crisis pertained only to Israeli figures, it might have continued indefinitely.

Reference:
The Jerusalem Post/AP, Brussels
Apr. 2, 2003
Belgium's war crime law set to be curtailed following US, Israeli criticism
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
BRUSSELS, Belgium
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/A/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1049249993790

Written by Gila Ansell-Brauner