Israel's Security Fence from a Legal Perspective

The Security Fence

Hearing at the Hague
Ten Key Questions
By Robert Klein

Editor: Gila Ansell Brauner

QUESTION #7

What other documents of International Law might be relevant?

The Hague Convention of 1907

Most contemporary documents relating to International Law address issues such as: general human rights in peacetime; nuclear weapons; Maritime Law, etc. The only other important document relating to warfare and International Law is the Hague Convention of 1907, regarding the laws and customs of war on land.

The UN request for an International Court of Justice advisory specifically recalls the Hague Convention in one of its introductory paragraphs. Although technically not applying to non-signatories such as the Palestinian Authority, as with the Fourth Geneva Convention, the State of Israel has chosen to apply all relevant provisions.

Land seizures and the “necessities of war”

The only article in the Hague Convention of relevance to the current advisory is Article 23, and specifically paragraph (g) which says that it is forbidden

… to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.

The key objections to the security fence being built by Israel is that a significant percentage of the fence lies within territory claimed by the Palestinians.
Article 23 clearly shows that random land seizure is forbidden, while confiscation or expropriation for military purposes is permissible.

As with similar articles in the Fourth Geneva Convention (see Question #6), the problem for the International Court of Justice is to decide whether or not concepts such as “the necessities of war” is adjudicable, and, if so, whether a fence intended to stop the penetration of terrorists can be considered such a “necessity”. Due to lack of precedents within the history of ICJ advisories (see Question #2), it is unclear whether or not such issues fall within the competence of the Court.

Whether or not public land within the West Bank should be considered “the enemy's property”, i.e. in this case Palestinian, please read the analysis of Question #5.

1977 Protocol I Additional to the Fourth Geneva Convention

In 1977 an addendum was made to the Fourth Geneva Convention. Though not considered a completely separate document on warfare and International Law, the Protocol does have some important clarifications and addendums to the Fourth Geneva Convention.

There is some doubt as to whether the Protocol is applicable to the current case as roughly one third of all countries, including Israel, did not sign it.

  • Generally speaking, countries are only bound to agreements they sign. Still, there are cases where a widely accepted document or norm is considered binding even on those who reject the document or norm.
  • However, because of the large number of non-participating countries, it is unclear whether there is sufficient acknowledgement of the Protocol for the International Court of Justice to consider it as a general convention of International Law, as is the case with the parent document, the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Nevertheless, given the fact that the UN included the Protocol as a document relevant to the current ICJ advisory, it will be addressed below.

(As a parenthetical explanation, the most likely cause for the relatively high number of non-participating countries is probably the rather politicized language of Article 2, which refers to

… peoples... fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.

No doubt, there was much concern that any country involved with any group challenging their sovereignty could be opening itself up for future diplomatic and legal problems, should a Security Council resolution label it as what otherwise should be a non-pejorative term, “Occupying Power” -- hence the failure of many countries to sign.)

First, it should be pointed out that Article 3b specifies that the Protocol and its provisions apply both to general combat situations, as well as to occupations.

For the purpose of this analysis however, the party in a position to do harm to a civilian population will be considered as specifically an Occupying Power, although the Protocol intended the term “Party” to refer to either an Occupying Power or to an army or military force encountering foreign civilians, though not in actual control of their government.

Article 54: Strong support for the legality of the security fence

Easily the most relevant article to the current advisory on Israel's security fence is Article 54, because it relates to the possibly destructive aspects of the fence for the Palestinian Arab population. It begins with the issue of starvation, but quickly branches out to other more relevant areas.

Article 54 in full:

Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population

1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the production of food-stuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the objects covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
(a) as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
(b) if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.
4. These objects shall not be made the object of reprisals.
5. In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in paragraph 2 may be made by a Party to the conflict within such territory under its own control where required by imperative military necessity.

In paragraph 2, we find issues which certainly relate to the concerns of the Palestinian Arabs, and hence to the legality of the fence.

For example, rendering agricultural land inaccessible is forbidden, when the object is specifically to deny the population the sustenance value of the land. However, the object of the security fence is to deny terrorists easy entry into Israel, into military bases within the West Bank, and into Jewish population centers within the West Bank.

Thus the International Court of Justice, if using Protocol I as a standard, would have to consider what the purpose of the security fence is, in order to determine whether it is in violation of Article 54.

In principle, the fence's express purpose is not inherently illegal.

Paragraph 3b describes a circumstance where an Occupying Power can a priori render as useless areas otherwise important for the sustenance of the local population.

This section states that where some area or object has provided direct support for military action against the Occupying Power, the only factor which would disallow rendering that area or object inaccessible to the population is if doing so would mean literally starving the population.
No one has claimed that the security fence would create such an extreme situation, and therefore the fence would seem to be allowable under Article 54 of Protocol I, or at least in those areas from where Palestinian attacks have originated.
Since terrorist infiltrations into Israel proper have originated from Arab towns and villages throughout most of the West Bank, and since the Jewish towns and villages in the West Bank have all been repeatedly threatened and attacked by Palestinian terrorists, most - if not all - of the fence would fall into this category of justified cases of restricted movement.

Finally, paragraph 5 explicitly states that the right to self defense of an Occupying Power's national territory against invasion justifies measures, even where vital land becomes inaccessible to the local population under occupation.

Thus, the last paragraph of Article 54 lays down the legal framework upon which the security fence can be justified, even when it deviates from the 1967 border, and even when the local area of the fence has not been directly implicated in supporting military or terrorist infiltrations, as per paragraph 3 above.

If the above interpretation of Article 54 is accepted by the ICJ, the only outstanding questions regarding the legality of the fence would involve determining if attempting to prevent rampant terrorist infiltrations constitutes “imperative military necessity” (see Question #6 on the 4GC) and whether this same rampant terrorist infiltration constitutes “invasion” or proves the potential for invasion.

The lessons of September 11th 2001 would seem to teach us that the answer to both questions is a resounding “Yes”. For beyond the already tragic loss of life that has occurred since the signing of Oslo, and especially since the dramatic increase of terrorism which began in October 2000, there is a very real concern that without a security barrier installed at a distance from Israel's borders to create sufficient warning time, a terrorist attack of major proportions could be perpetrated.

Two near-successful mega-attacks in 2002

Indeed, there have been at least two near-successful attempts at “mega-attacks” on Israel by Palestinian West Bank-based forces.

  • On April 26, 2002, IDF intelligence intercepted a truck from Qalqilya in the West Bank, which was laden with 1,000 pounds of explosives. Documents in the truck showed the driver's target was the Azrieli Towers, two twin 50-story buildings in downtown Tel Aviv.
  • On May 22, 2002, members of Arafat's Fatah Party successfully planted a bomb on an Israeli fuel-gas tanker truck. When the truck pulled in to a major gas depot in northern Tel Aviv, the bomb was detonated by remote control. Fortunately, the truck did not explode as planned. Had the truck exploded, experts agree that the ensuing explosion of the depot facility would have immediately killed about half of the approximately 20,000 residents, workers, and drivers within a one mile radius of the depot. In addition, many more would have been severely burned, and most of northern Tel Aviv would have been destroyed by the initial blast and subsequent fires.

The threat to Israel from terrorism is clear and present, and could be as devastating as a conventional military invasion. Therefore, under Article 54 of the 1977 Protocol to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the concept of an anti-terrorism fence built on occupied territory, even where it causes hardship to the local population, would seem to be manifestly legal.

Recent Security Council resolutions in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon add further support to this interpretation.

Article 4: Occupying Powers are not necessarily foreign to the Occupied Territory

Article 4 is also quite interesting in that it answers a question whose answer is only implied in the Fourth Geneva Convention, namely:

Does the application or the applicability in principle of the Fourth Geneva Convention to a given occupied territory imply anything about the legal status of the territory, or about the sovereignty claims of either the Occupying Power or the local protected persons under occupation?

The answer is clearly: No.
The text of Article 4 reads:

The application of the Conventions and of this Protocol, as well as the conclusion of the agreements provided for therein, shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. Neither the occupation of a territory nor the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in question.

This is an important point, because there is a common misconception that if the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the West Bank and other disputed territories - and specifically, if Israel can be termed an “Occupying Power” - it ipso facto means that Israel must be a foreign invader without a legal claim to any of the territories.

This is simply not the case, as is clear from the text of Article 4 of the Protocol.

This point regarding the lack of connection between occupation and the legal status of the land, and parties involved, is implicit in the text of the original 4GC - which studiously avoids any language that might imply that Occupying Powers are necessarily on foreign soil, or that protected persons necessarily have sovereign rights.

Hence, the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention or Protocol I to the West Bank does not prejudge the legal status of the land, the Israeli claims, or the Arab claims.

 

 

 

 


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