Israel's Security Fence from a Legal Perspective | Question 6

The Security Fence

Hearing at the Hague
Ten Key Questions
By Robert Klein

Editor: Gila Ansell Brauner

QUESTION #6

What articles in the 4th Geneva Convention might be germane to the fence's construction?

Background:

The Fourth Geneva Convention (henceforth “the Convention” or “the 4GC”) is a protocol of how countries which are “High Contracting Parties”, i.e. signatories of the Convention, should conduct themselves should they be in a situation where their army controls the territory and government in which civilians of another signatory country live. In this situation, the controlling country is called “the Occupying Power”, while those living under occupation are called “protected persons”. (For a discussion of whether or not Israel qualifies as an Occupying Power, please see the analysis of Question #4.)

Occupying Powers have a number of rights and obligations under the provisions of the 4GC. The basic approach of the 4GC is that, regardless of whether any given occupation is legal or illegal, mutually-agreed upon standards of conduct can help to insure that non-combatant civilians living under occupation do not have to suffer any more than necessary given the wartime environment.

Recognizing that security is a legitimate concern during wartime, and recognizing that not all civilians choose to remain non-combatants, the authors of the 4GC wisely created a system of “restrictive measures” which constitute the legal options for self-defense on the part of the Occupying Power.

At the same time, with equal wisdom, the authors put certain limits on what, when, and how the Occupying Power may implement restrictive measures with regards to the civilians under its control.

Below is a list of the articles most relevant to the issues surrounding the construction of Israel's security fence, with an accompanying brief analysis after each article or article excerpt. Since most of the concern about the fence has centered on the legality of the restrictiveness of the fence, those articles which deal with restrictive measures are especially emphasized.

The articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention most relevant to the issue of the security fence:

Freedom of movement

Article 23: ...The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of [medical, religious, food, and clothing] consignments... is subject to the condition that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy
through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments for goods which would
otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy

Article 23 clearly demonstrates that freedom of movement is not a right of persons living under occupation. Even the movement of basic necessities is controlled by the Occupying Power.
If innocuous food items can represent a security threat justifying the restriction of movement by the Occupying Power, certainly people who are capable of perpetrating attacks on civilians can be restricted in their movement as well.
Therefore, the fact that the security fence limits the free movement of persons living in the West Bank does not render it illegal.

To further underscore that freedom of movement, while a human right in peacetime, is by no means a right of protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the proper interpretation of the oft-quoted Article 49 will be considered.
After stating that no matter the motive, forced transfer is definitively illegal, Article 49 then goes on in paragraph 2 to provide two critical exceptions:

Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.

If “imperative military reasons” can legalize the transfer of entire populations against their will, then there can be no doubt that freedom of movement is not a right of protected persons. Put differently, Occupying Powers have the right to restrict movement, in accordance with their military needs.

The issue of freedom of movement therefore really boils down, from a legal perspective, to:

  • Whether the security fence is justified by the current military considerations Israel faces;
    or
  • Whether the fence is a case of disproportionate use of force in response to a security issue.

There is no precedent in the history of ICJ advisories, regarding the Court's competence to determine what the military needs of a country are.

Moreover, no country has had to cope with such a high degree of terrorist and guerilla attacks, making it all the harder to look for precedents by which to judge the proportionality of the response.

Nevertheless, the ICJ could look to the UN's condoning of Morocco's thousand-mile security barrier in Western Sahara (for details, see Question #2) as an example of how far fewer attacks and far less serious attacks can still justify the construction of a security fence in occupied territory.

Military operations in the heart of populated areas

Article 28: The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

The fence is being built in some areas where there are Palestinians living in the immediate vicinity. Some claim that the IDF may not operate in such areas because it disrupts the lives of those living there, and that, by extension, the fence is illegal in those areas where it disrupts Palestinian lives.

However, Article 28 informs us that the presence of protected persons does not prevent the Occupying Power from taking military actions there. This could apply equally well to military operations involving weapons, or to the construction of a security fence for strictly defensive, military purposes.

Collective punishment vs. Restrictive measures

So far it would seem that the 4GC allows Occupying Powers much leeway for security with few real restrictions on that leeway. One article which puts a check on the possible disproportionate use of force is Article 33:

No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.

The ICJ could rule that the fence is a kind of collective punishment, in response to the crimes of individual Palestinians who attack Israelis.

But it could also view the fence not as a punishment, but as a restrictive measure, insuring Israeli security. Again, there seems to be little precedent to help guide the ICJ in determining such a subtle point.

Restrictive measures affecting property

Article 46: In so far as they have not been previously withdrawn, restrictive measures taken regarding protected persons shall be cancelled as soon as possible after the close of hostilities. Restrictive measures affecting their property shall be cancelled, in accordance with the law of the Detaining Power, as soon as possible after the close of hostilities.

Article 46 provides further proof that property can be the object of restrictive measures, and that in general, such measures need only be repealed after the close of hostilities, and not as a condition for the ending of hostilities.

Article 53: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.

The 4GC clearly provides that destruction of property may occur for the purpose of carrying out military operations.

Article 53 only comes to prohibit random or punitive destruction of property, but not to interfere with an Occupying Power's military actions.

The security fence under discussion has been cited as occasionally causing property damage. Assuming this is an accurate description, the question becomes whether, as a kind of military operation, the damage caused by the fence was “absolutely necessary”, or could have been avoided without compromising the effectiveness of the fence in the relevant area.

Again, this is the kind of question which may be beyond the competence of the ICJ to adjudicate.

Synopsis:

The Fourth Geneva Convention clearly grants Occupying Powers the right to take military actions within the occupied territory which guarantee its security.

In addition, Occupying Powers have the right to place restrictions on the local population, including restriction of movement, restriction of goods and services delivered, and can even include destruction of personal property.

In all such cases there is mitigating terminology, such as “imperative military reasons” and “absolutely necessary”. On what basis the International Court of Justice will determine if the fence meets these vague but important stipulations is unclear.

The case of the Moroccan security barrier in Western Sahara (see Question #2) may provide a precedent.

Ultimately the Court may decide that the situation is too complex for it to be appropriate for the Court to rule on the matter.

 

 

 

 


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