Road-tripping in the Strip
By Amos Harel
Reproduced with permission from ©Haaretzdaily.com
In a meeting that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon held this week with activists
of the United Jewish Appeal in New York, he reiterated his support for Israel's
evacuation of the Philadelphi route on the border with Egypt, within the framework
of the disengagement plan. "If we do not want to continue being considered
responsible for the Gaza Strip, we must allow the Palestinians an open border
with Egypt," Sharon said. However, in the same breath, he added that
the defense establishment is vehemently opposed to the evacuation of Philadelphi
because it could result in greater arms smuggling from Sinai into the Strip.
The prime minister presented a possible way out of this dilemma - an Egyptian
commitment to combat the smuggling - but hinted that Israel Defense Forces
troops would remain in the narrow corridor opposite Rafah if the defense establishment
is not convinced that Egypt will meet its commitment.
Why is Sharon, who in the past did not bother asking the senior levels of
the IDF and the Shin Bet security service about the disengagement plan, but
presented it as a fait accompli, subordinating his will this time to the security
experts? One possibility is that, as with some of his declarations relating
to disengagement (for example, "There will be no evacuation under fire"),
this is mere lip service, with little connection with the prime minister's
real plans. Another possibility is that the rare consensus within the defense
establishment (the only officer who supported a withdrawal from Philadelphi
in the discussion Sharon held a year ago was the present deputy chief of staff,
Major General Moshe Kaplinsky) has left the prime minister no way out. And
maybe both explanations intertwine, in the wake of the surfacing of a vital
element in the equation of forces that changed two weeks ago.
The official who loudly led the opposition to leaving Philadelphi was Avi
Dichter, the outgoing Shin Bet chief. Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, who
is against the disengagement plan, but thinks that if Israel is already withdrawing
it should also leave Philadelphi, remarked recently that every time he met
with Dichter, he emerged convinced of the scale of the danger entailed in
evacuating the road. With Dichter now out (though his successor, Yuval Diskin,
takes the same approach), the opposition to leaving the road has weakened.
The new alignment of forces at the top of the defense establishment may give
Sharon and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz enough leeway to rely on a vague Egyptian
promise that the smuggling problem will be dealt with - and to evacuate Philadelphi.
Two sides of the dispute
Generally speaking, the agonizing over Philadelphi can be described as a
dispute between the political-legal argument and the security concern. Israel
will find it difficult to portray the withdrawal as total disengagement from
Gaza in the international arena if it continues to maintain full control over
Palestinian airspace, with progress in the maritime arena being slow (it will
take years before a harbor is built in Gaza) and with the IDF also maintaining
a foothold in Gaza in the form of a presence along Philadelphi. By remaining
there, Israel will strengthen the Palestinian suspicion that the Sharon plan
is a typical Israeli plot ("muamara," in Arabic) aimed at imprisoning
the Palestinian Authority within the Gaza Strip and freezing the negotiations
on the West Bank for years. The Palestinians also know that the hope for help
from Egypt has little to rest on - neither in the form of work permits for
Gaza residents, nor in the purchase of goods. If Israel wants to show the
world that the occupation of the Gaza Strip has ended, a withdrawal from Philadelphi
is a first logical step.
The counterargument addresses the smuggling problem. The Shin Bet describes
what is going on under Philadelphi, even today, as a "highway of tunnels"
and fears that the phenomenon will only be aggravated after the evacuation
of the area. The main concern, as is known, is that weapons capable of "disrupting
the balance" will be smuggled in, such as anti-aircraft missiles, sophisticated
explosives and long-range Katyusha rockets.
In a talk given recently by Y., the chief of research in the Shin Bet, in
an intelligence forum, he explained the overall context. After the withdrawal,
he said, Gaza will become the "home front" for fueling terrorism
in the West Bank. The know-how and the weapons will get to the West Bank via
indirect means, and the West Bank will become the real battlefield. Both the
Shin Bet and the IDF say that the scenario of Katyusha rockets being fired
from Gaza at Ashkelon is actually less relevant in the first stage, because
the PA will want to show that the territory it has received is quiet (whereas
the West Bank, which Israel will continue to hold, will burn).
Mofaz's meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at Sharm el-Sheikh
in March was supposed to advance the agreement on the deployment of Egyptian
soldiers along the border and facilitate Israel's departure from Philadelphi.
However, since then, matters have only grown more complicated. The sides do
not concur yet about the "reversibility" of the agreement. Israel
is presenting the deployment on the Egyptian side of Philadelphi as a "pilot"
plan, whose success will be examined by the sides after a time, when a decision
will be made as to whether to continue.
The Egyptians want a permanent presence there and an immediate expansion
to the entire border sector, from Rafah to Eilat. The two countries are close
to reaching a compromise on the first subject (concerning whether a decision
to continue the deployment will be made jointly), but not on the second (Israel
is now insisting on an Egyptian deployment on Philadelphi only).
With or without the road
The IDF, which is waiting for the political echelon to decide, is readying
itself for two possibilities: disengagement with Philadelphi or without it.
The army is going ahead with investments that are aimed at upgrading the struggle
against the tunnels and improving protection of the soldiers on the road,
but is focusing on a "flexible" infrastructure - one that can be
evacuated quickly if needed.
Thus, in continuance of the steel wall that was built along part of the road,
with foundations deep in the ground, a concrete wall is now being built above,
which can be removed in the future. "We will not pour NIS 100 million
into Philadelphi now, as long as the future of the road is not clear,"
a senior officer said.
The plan to build a deep canal (entailing the demolition of hundreds of Palestinian
homes) has also been frozen, among other reasons because of the reservations
of the attorney general. Despite the cautious use of resources, the situation
of the soldiers along the road has in fact improved. The wall is hampering
would-be diggers of tunnels and making relatively free movement of vehicles
possible (the IDF is again using jeeps there instead of armored personnel
carriers). The increased maneuverability has made it possible for the IDF
to uncover more tunnels - about 20 in the past two months alone.
Two senior officers who were asked this week about their gut feeling concerning
the future of the road said they think it will be evacuated, though this will
occur some months after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip.
The army appears to be internalizing the change. Not only by its reluctance
to invest in the site, but also in its plans for the months ahead. Even without
a decision to evacuate the road, Southern Command is considering a reduction
of the army's presence there. The idea that is now being given serious thought
is to evacuate the bases along the road (Girit, Herdon, Termit and Yaklaz)
and to replace them with mobile forces, which will patrol Philadelphi in armored
vehicles.
But it is not clear why Israel wants to rely on an agreement with Egypt to
carry out the evacuation. So far, Sharon and his aides have not been able
to explain why they believe that Egypt, which did not lift a finger to stop
the smuggling during the years of fighting in the territories, will change
its tune and work to stop them after the IDF leaves Philadelphi. Or why they
think Egypt will succeed in a mission in which the army, by its own account,
obtained only partial results. It is difficult to understand why, in the name
of an important tactical reason in and of itself (fighting the smugglers),
Israel is willing to risk an important strategic achievement from the Camp
David agreement in 1978 (non-deployment of Egyptian military forces in Sinai).
Would it not be better to disengage unilaterally from Philadelphi, too, instead
of creating a fictitious "address" there for complaints, which in
any event will not meet the Israeli expectations? After all, the IDF withdrew
from Lebanon leaving behind an infrastructure that has now swollen into 12,000
rockets, which Hezbollah is aiming at the north of the country - and Israel
is living with that risk more or less sanguinely, albeit also with concern.