Last update - 22:49 10/06/2004
Inside Track / If Egypt were Jordan
By Amir Oren
Reproduced with permission from ©Haaretzdaily
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=435191
It's not only in the Eurovision Song Contest and the basketball and soccer
leagues - in the eyes of the U.S. army, too, Israel is situated in Europe.
Up until March, Syria and Lebanon were also on that continent, until President
George W. Bush discreetly uprooted them in a decision that produced no reverberations.
The decision means that the two countries were moved from the army's European
Command (EUCOM) to the central command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for
countries such as Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. "Politically,
culturally and militarily," a senior official explained to the Pentagon
press service, "Syria and Lebanon are more oriented to the countries
of CENTCOM," while Israel is more aligned with Europe.
Bush's decision effectively put an end - at least for the next two years
during which the U.S. Unified Command plan will not be updated - to the disagreement
over placing Israel and the Arab states. Israel was seen as part of Europe
in scenarios for a third world war, where it would serve as the Middle Eastern
wing of the Sixth Fleet's battle against the Soviets. In the 1980s, the same
U.S. fleet operated against targets in Syria and Lebanon. In American eyes,
Israel is included in the list of 13 "Major Non-NATO Allies" outside
the European continent.
Since the Americans have been encouraging security cooperation between two
of EUCOM's Middle Eastern members (Israel and Turkey) and one CENTCOM country
(Jordan), the true meaning of leaving Israel in the army's European command
has nothing to with relations between Israel and Jordan, nor with the possibility
of an outbreak of violence on the northern Syria-Lebanon-Hezbollah front,
which the Americans see as part of the ongoing campaign in Iraq and the one
that could open in Iran.
The meaning is that Egypt is not to be trusted - not in Rafah, not in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and not in any political initiatives in the region.
Sharon's public relations efforts for his Gaza disengagement plan create the
false impression that the Egyptians are close to being convinced that they
had better accept a certain amount of responsibility for the Palestinian wild
west along the coastline Strip. The accumulated experience with Egypt proves
that Israel's salvation will not come from Cairo.
If Jordan were in control of Gaza, with a port that would allow it access
to the Mediterranean Sea and with the legacy of Black September in the background,
the Israel Defense Forces could forgo its control of the Philadelphi route.
If Egypt were Jordan, and security forces loyal to Hosni Mubarak were securing
the border like the Jordanian army does, preventing infiltration attempts,
Israel could afford to get rid of Gaza.
The danger to Israelis serving in official positions in Cairo and Amman is
similar, and so is Mubarak and King Abdullah's fear of extremist Islamic forces,
local and Palestinian, which threaten their regimes. However, what the Jordanians
are doing with meticulous care, the Egyptians refuse to do; and since they
can, the conclusion is that they don't want to. Egypt does not want to go
to war with Israel, but it finds continuous Israeli bleeding convenient; otherwise,
Mubarak would have pressured Yasser Arafat four years ago at Camp David to
reach a settlement with Ehud Barak.
Egypt, whose internal problems are threatening to topple its regime, is contending
with Israel for leadership of the region, and it knows that a stable, lasting
peace will position Israel and Palestine's combined, thriving economy at the
forefront of the Middle East.
The demand that Israel dismantle the weapons that Egypt does not possess
- namely, the nuclear ones - receives American support in principle, but only
on condition that a "political agreement providing safe and secure borders
for the parties" be achieved first, as John Wolf, U.S. assistant secretary
at the State Department's Bureau for Nonproliferation said a month ago in
New York.
The frequent contacts between Sharon, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom, Mossad
chief Meir Dagan, Shin Bet security service head Avi Dichter and others with
Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman give a positive wrapping to a problematic
content. So do the talks by Mubarak, Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher and others
with senior Israeli officials other than Sharon, as well as with Arafat, Muhammad
Dahlan and other Palestinians. These talks are meant to portray Egypt in Washington
as striving for progress in the Israeli-Palestine conflict. It is indeed a
spectacle of handshakes and reclining on sofas, because in Cairo they know
that real negotiations are held only with the prime minister. The schedule
for the contacts is set according to the Egyptians' whims, signaling which
side is calling the shots.
War with Egypt?
Ahead of this week's government discussion, Sharon intimidated the heads
of the army and the Shin Bet with the veiled threat that they may be blamed
for the failure of his plan if they dare come out against it. The security
officials understood the hint and tried to change the format and tone without
appearing spineless. They sounded like salespeople who market their goods
a little differently to various potential buyers: "Cheap, yet of high
quality," to one, "high quality, but cheap," to another. In
contradiction to exaggerated reports by ministers loyal to Sharon, the security
chiefs didn't join forces to help the prime minister, but it was enough for
him that they didn't all stand up against him. It is no coincidence that GOC
Southern Command Dan Harel, who consistently objected to the plan, was absent
from the list of those invited to give their military point of view on the
future of the region under his direct command.
The IDF believes that Egypt wants to position itself as a pro-American regional
superpower that shies away from war with Israel but competes with it for leadership
of the region. The army also believes that the Egyptian army is preparing
itself for the possibility of moving into Sinai, in contradiction to the peace
agreement.
The Suez Canal will be the major obstacle in the Egyptian army's movement
into the peninsula as part of an all-out Arab campaign, with the aim of fighting
in the desert toward the Negev, or at least forcing a substantial number of
the IDF's southern divisions to remain in the region rather then fight on
other fronts. A violation of the peace agreement without actually using the
military will force Israel, unless it manages to achieve a military victory
within a week on the other fronts (Palestinian or northern) to choose between
ignoring Egypt and focusing on the other fronts, or taking up the Egyptian
challenge. The second alternative is known as the "rendezvous scenario"
- while the Egyptian army moves east from Sinai's demilitarized zone A, the
IDF will move west.
The Egyptians have been positioning low-level regional policing forces in
zones A and B. Their aim is to gather intelligence on IDF patrol activity
in peacetime, and on major military offensive efforts during a war. In recent
years these forces have been storing fuel, but not water or ammunition, for
fighting along the main routes along which they believe the IDF armored forces
will move. Stopping this movement has been practiced with the use of Special
Forces highly equipped with antitank and night vision equipment.
The hope is for an American intervention that will stop both sides, prevent
a deterioration of the situation, restore things to their former position
and prevent a violent breakout. But there is no certainty that this will actually
happen.
The IDF fears that a war with Egypt, perhaps in a post-Mubarak period, is
not a wild hallucination. The Israeli objective that will be presented to
the government in the event that such a war breaks out, will be inflicting
severe damage on Egyptian military hardware (mostly air force) but not troops,
as well as a temporary takeover of the Ras Muhammad / El Arish line, in order
to gain the option of returning the western part of Sinai in exchange for
reinstating the agreement.
Agents of the sides
In the Philadelphi tunnels, there is no need for observing, there is a need
for fighting, a senior IDF officer who has reservations about the security-related
aspects of Sharon's plan said this week. He added that the Egyptians, or anyone
else for that matter, would at the most send inspectors who would write reports,
not soldiers that would kill and be killed.
The only Israeli border that does not host international observers belonging
to the United Nations or other multinational organizations is the Jordanian
border. Israel and Syria are separated by the UNDOF observers, while Lebanon
is home to UNIFIL. On both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian border, the Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO) carries out its patrols under joint American-Israeli-Egyptian
funding ($50 million a year), headed by an American director general - a former
diplomat who sits in Rome - and commanded by an officer from another country
- currently Italy's General Roberto Martinelli - whose headquarters is located
at the El-Gorah base near Rafah.
The multinational force has shrunk over the years from 2,700 soldiers to
some 1,700. It has three infantry battalions from the U.S., Colombia and Fiji,
a maintenance-support battalion, American helicopters and Italian patrol boats
at the Tiran Straits. When the force was first set up, Sharm al-Sheikh was
considered the most sensitive spot, which had brought about two wars. The
American battalion was therefore positioned in the south, enjoying a private
beach of its own for swimming, scuba diving and tanning. The Colombian battalion
patrols the central Sinai region, while the soldiers from Fiji are responsible
for the north, including the outskirts of Egyptian Rafah. The force's position
in Rafah, opposite the Dahaniya airport to the north of the Kerem Shalom checkpoint,
has been manned regularly since October 2000. A Pentagon delegation offered
improvements in the position as well as the rest of the force's defenses against
Palestinian attacks. A company of Fijians is stationed at the Rafah base,
on alert. So far they have not been called to protect the multinational patrols.
A senior official with the multinational force was asked this week whether
the force would be able to expand its activities to the Philadelphi route,
which is an integral part of the security Appendix D of the Israeli-Egyptian
peace agreement. IDF forces in this area were meant to be restricted to a
mechanized brigade on the other side of the Egyptian border. According to
the appendix - signed on Israel's side by Major General Avraham Tamir - the
width of area D was to be three kilometers, meaning deep into Palestinian
Rafah. In the Oslo Accords, Israel waived this width and agreed to limit itself
to the few dozen meters of the Philadelphi route.
Since the beginning of the October 2000 confrontations, Israel no longer
strictly abides by the understandings concerning the width and the restriction
of military presence in the area. But Tamir and others warn against the temptation
to reopen the peace agreement with Egypt in order to beef up the Egyptian
military presence, in exchange for Cairo's keeping an eye on the Rafah free-trade
tunnel zone.
"We, as is well known, are the agents of the sides," said a multinational
force member. "If they want us to operate there, and agree between themselves,
we can discuss it. Until now we have not been asked to do so." The main
obstacle: The Palestinians are not a party to the multinational force, and
it's hard to believe that Fijian soldiers who came to make a living by watching
the dunes of Sinai, will risk their lives in battles against Hamas and Islamic
Jihad.