1. Foreword
2. Influential Figures
3. Military, Security, Government & Academic Figures
4. More Online References
Below is a summary table of what Israel's top security experts, academics,
and senior officials, have said publicly in relation to the security ramifications
of Disengagement. The experts were selected first and foremost for their seniority,
but also for other attributes, such as degree of involvement in the formulation
of the Disengagement Plan, appearance before the Knesset's Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee, or for a particularly significant security observation;
the material has been collated from a range of resources and references are
provided..
By definition, it might appear that a substantial ratio of security experts
are quite concerned about the security implications of Disengagement: most
of the opinions range from cautious to foreboding, but one should distinguish
between professional analytical expertise and the responsibility these figures
carry to advise on contingency planning. Indeed, many of these same experts
have gone on record as supporting Disengagement. It all comes down to cost-benefit
analyses of diplomatic, political, demographic, social, and/or economic considerations.
The preponderance of cautious opinions or serious concerns raised should
therefore be understood as a signal that Israel's Disengagement involves genuine
security risks, which need to be taken into account when assessing the value
and practicalities of the Disengagement Plan.
| Security Expert |
Position |
Key Security Observations & Opinions |
| Yossi Alpher |
rmer Director, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University |
1. The real security risks raised by Disengagement and withdrawal are
worth the risk, when balanced against the demographic realities.
2. A final status two-state solution cannot guarantee that terrorism and
missiles will cease. Support for Disengagement must therefore be based
on a prioritization of demographic and political benefits over security
concerns.
Yossi Alpher explains why Disengagement is worth the security risks
http://www.peacenow.org/briefs.asp?rid=&cid=187 |
| Maj-Gen. Yaakov Amidror |
Former head of Israel's National Defense College; Former head of Research
and Assessment Division, IDF intelligence |
1. Islamic terror will gain a huge psychological boost, since Disengagement
will be perceived as "flight"from terror.
2. After Disengagement, the Gaza Strip will represent a strategic threat
to Israel .
3. The IDF will lose both response ability and local intelligence by abandoning
the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, both of which are likely to become
sources of future missile attacks.
4. The Gaza Strip fence will be far less defensible without the existing
IDF-controlled 1 km buffer zone inside the electronic fence.
5. Only continued Israeli military presence can maintain Israel's current
improved security situation; Israel should wait for a true peace partner
to emerge before negotiating future withdrawals.
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n3p3Ami.html |
| Yigal Ben-Aryeh |
Israel Electric Corporation official and responsible for preparedness
after Disengagement. |
1. The Rutenberg Power Station South of Ashkelon, which supplies 22.5%
of Israel's electricity, is already within range of Kassam rockets, yet
has not been attacked so far.
2. The expanse and design of the station makes it unlikely for a Kassam
to be able to cause a serious reduction in electrical output.
3. However, a successful hit on the station would also leave Hebron area
Arabs without electricity, acting as a major deterrent to attacks on the
station. |
| Maj.-Gen. David Ben-Besht |
Commander of The Israel Navy |
1. Arms, terrorist and drug smuggling via sea will increase after Disengagement.
2. Israel needs to invest in more sophisticated patrol boats to monitor
fishing boats.
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/news.php3?id=74589 |
| Maj.-Gen. Eitan Ben-Eliyahu |
Former Commander of the Israel Airforce; currently involved in hi-tech
defense design |
1. Israel has the technology to strike specific targets with sufficient
speed, such that there is no longer a military need to maintain a physical
presence in the Gaza Strip - unless terrorism and missile attacks were
to rise dramatically, in which case, the IDF would be compelled to reoccupy
the Strip.
2. Terrorists may soon manage to extend the range of the Qassam rocket
to 20km and could then hit targets in major population areas within range
of the northern West Bank, such as: Jerusalem, Petah Tikva, Netanya, Kfar
Saba, and Ra'anana. Ben-Gurion Airport would also then come within missile
range, which would seriously affect tourism even if no planes were hit.
3. Disengagement will neither improve nor harm Israel's security in the
South. The debate over Gush Katif is a purely ideological issue regarding
the political and spiritual value of the Gaza Strip settlements.
4. Israel must maintain the military and political ability to enter the
Gaza Strip quickly when necessary, in order to deal with missile attacks.
5. Disengagement will detract from the political ability of the PA to
launch attacks from the Gaza Strip; hence in the long run, Disengagement
may lead to a reduction in missile attacks.
Security and political aspects of Disengagement
http://toronto.ujcfedweb.org/content_display.html?ArticleID=122559
http://www.aijac.org.au/updates/Aug-03/140803.html |
| Brig.-Gen. Shlomo Brom |
Senior analyst, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University |
1. Disengagement will fail if it is not fully coordinated with the
PA, including agreement on the goals of the post-disengagement political
process. One of these goals must be the complete withdrawal of the IDF
from the West Bank.
2. In order for the occupation of the Gaza Strip to end, Israel must
leave the Philadelphia Route, and cede control over Gazan airspace and
coastal waters. International monitors must be used to ensure weapons
smuggling via land, air and sea stops.
3. Disengagement will fail if terrorism and counter-terrorism measures
persist.
4. Disengagement will fail if the living conditions of the PA residents
do not improve rapidly in the near future.
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n2p2Bro.html
Teh Disengagement Plan: The Day After:
http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v8n1p2Brom.html
|
| Col. Uzi Buchbinder |
Head of the IDF Home Front Command's Civil Defense Department |
1. IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will leave 46 Israeli communities
within the current range of Palestinian Kassam rockets, and at increased
risk of terrorist infiltration.
2. At least 17 Israeli communities are at high risk for rockets and infiltrations,
and construction will begin on special defense measures |
| Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Uzi Dayan |
Former IDF Deputy Chief-of-Staff, former Chairman of Israel's National
Security Council, Chairman of the Forum for National Responsibility, founding
Chairman of Israel's National Committee for the Security Fence |
1. Assessment: The emergence of a pragmatic Palestinian leadership
willing to reign in the terrorists is a realistic possibility in the
near future. At the same time, such a leadership will not be strong
enough to completely control the terrorists, and therefore Israel must
develop a security concept to complement its cooperation or coordination
with a pragmatic, anti-terror, Palestinian leadership.
2. Assessment: Israel needs a security strategy, as part of its comprehensive
approach to the PA. Disengagement, which includes the building of the
West Bank security fence, can act as the first stage, provided Israel
is prepared to withdraw unilaterally from the fenced-out portions of
the West Bank, should the negotiation track fail.
3. Belief: That the completion of the West Bank security fence is crucial
to provision of security for Israel, hence to making Disengagement work.
4. Belief: That disengagement will reduce the demographic pressure
on Israel, which will cease to have administrative responsibilities,
or control, over Arab residents of the PA.
http://www.israelfence.org/dayanspeech.html
http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041111-025414-4599r.htm |
| Yosef Draisen |
Water Commission official |
1. The Beit Shean and Jezreel valleys could be dried up by Palestinians
drilling and siphoning off water in the northern West Bank. |
| Giora Eiland |
Head of Israel's National Security Council, designer of Disengagement
Plan, Chairman of Steering Committee for Implementation |
1. "… should it prove impossible to implement the Road
Map, Israel will simply have no alternative other than to initiate unilateral
disengagement. This will reflect a decision on our part to begin a process
of separation between our two peoples." Feb 12, 2004
http://www.embassyofisrael.com/articles/2004/February/2004021200.htm
2. Estimates: 3 possible scenarios (October 19, 2004):
i. Less violence and a calming of the situation*;
ii. Terrorists in Gaza will view evacuation as a victory and step up
their attacks (short term)
iii. Terrorists in West Bank will continue violence, triggering IDF
response, terrorists in Gaza will then join in.
3. *Belief: That the withdrawal will lead to a drop in terrorism, in
the long term.
http://www.isracast.com/Transcripts/191004a_trans.htm |
| Brig.-Gen. Gadi Eisencott |
Commander, IDF's Judea and Samaria Division, new Director, IDF Intelligence |
1. Belief: the war on terror is won by intelligence, control over
the territory and population.
2.After disengagement, the IDF will have limited control; there will
be no choice but to transfer control to the Palestinians, who will be
assisted by third parties, such as American and British intelligence.
3. Belief: that many Palestinians today think that terror does them
no good, and much depends on the Israeli side, too. But, there should
be zero tolerance of Kassam rocket missiles on Israeli cities, and if
violence is renewed, the IDF must do everything to win tangibly, at
the lowest possible cost to Israel.
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/577293.html
or schiff.html |
| Carmi Gillon |
Mayor of Mevasseret Tzion, former Chief of Israel's General Security
Services |
1. The PA has the power to prevent terrorism, but still lacks the will
to do so. A two-state solution will be viable when the PA desires to stamp
out terrorism.
2. Intelligence gathering can be done effectively, even without an open
IDF presence in the Territories, although the means are top secret (presumably
hi-tech spy equipment and a human spy/informer network).
3. The main reason to support Disengagement is that military occupation
is bad for Israeli society; security risks can be minimized.
Haaretz Q&A with Carmi Gillon
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/QA.jhtml?qaNo=126&m=126#4734 |
| Prof. Efraim Inbar |
Director, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), Bar Ilan
University |
1. Israel should not relinquish the three North Gaza settlements adjacent
to Israel, because this sets a precedent for withdrawal to the 1967 borders,
in that it prejudges issues, such as changing demographic realities.
2. Israel should relinquish control over the Philadelphia Route,because
unless Disengagement is complete it will become a pretext for further
attacks. Moreover, a common PA-Egypt border would create a demographic
“safety valve”, while motivating Egypt to assert more control
over the Gaza Strip, in order to prevent the emergence of a Hamas state.
3. Israel should cease providing water, electricity and gas to the Gaza
Strip, as well as close entry to Israel for Palestinian workers, in order
to make it clear to the PA that Disengagement is not a reward, but rather
a punishment for terror. |
| Roni Mehatzri |
Mayor of Ashkelon |
1. The Katza gas facility has above ground storage units within 1 mile
of Ashkelon residents, such that a missile strike could endanger up to
10,000 residents.
Maj.-Gen. Yair Naveh IDF Head of Central Command 1. Arms smuggling to
the West Bank has already increased sharply, in anticipation of the pull-out.
2. After disengagement, terror from the northern West Bank will increase,
and missile attacks will also begin from there.
Proposal to keep the IDF in northern Samaria for at least 4 months after
Disengagement
http://www.isracast.com/Transcripts/290505a_trans.htm |
| Amir Oren |
Military affairs correspondent, Haaretz newspaper |
1. Egypt aspires to be the dominant economic power in the Middle East,
and feels threatened by an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty. Egypt has
therefore allowed the terrorists to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip
from Egyptian territory.
2. Egypt has always had the resources to stifle arms smuggling. Hence,
the existence of widespread smuggling proves that Egypt views the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as an Egyptian interest.
3. IDF security experts view war with Egypt as a real possibility after
Mubarak's death. Hence, relinquishing control of the Gaza-Egypt border
constitutes a future strategic threat to Israel.
4. PM Ariel Sharon has intimidated IDF and other security officials, some
of whom have since withheld their security concerns regarding the Disengagement
Plan.
Why Egypt wants Israelis and Palestinians to fight http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=435191
or oren.html |
| Emanuel Sakal |
Director-General of Katza gas facility, South of Ashkelon |
1. The Katza gas facility's gas containers are subterranean and dispersed,
making the danger of a Kassam rocket attack minimal.
MK Yuval Steinitz Chairman, The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee
1. Egypt has deliberately tolerated arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip.
2. Handing over control of the Egypt-Gaza border to Egypt would be a strategic
disaster.
Defense Minister Mofaz; Security & Defense Committee Chairman Steinitz
on security issues
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=433639
or mofaz.html |
| Col. Mordechai Yogev |
Member, National Security Forum |
1. Disengagement and withdrawal from Northern Shomron will expose over
150,000 Israelis in North-Central Israel to missile attacks, in addition
to a similar number around the Gaza Strip.
2. South of Ashkelon, several power facilities will be exposed to increased
threats of missile attack after Disengagement. This includes: 3 power
stations, an oil pipeline, a gas storage facility, a gas depot planned
for the area, and the Rabin power station in Hadera (adjacent to the West
Bank).
3. The IDF needs to control all areas from where missiles are launched,
in order to guarantee Israeli. |