History of the Disengagement Plan
by Robert Klein & Gila Ansell-Brauner
- The Context
- Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to U.S. President
George W. Bush, April 14, 2004
Exercise & Analysis points
- Prime Minister Sharon's address to the annual Herzliya
Conference on December 16, 2004
Exercise & Analysis points
- Other Possible Factors
- Likud Party Referendum, May 2004
- Compensation-Evacuation Law – Table & Analysis
points
- Political Instability and Disengagement
- FAQ: Questions about Disengagement
A. The Context
The Israeli Disengagement Plan emerged from a political and a diplomatic
context that can be best summarised as follows:
- Since 2000, the Intifada had escalated and abated but had not ended,
despite many attempts to restore the Peace Process, including the Quartet's
Road Map, and all Israel's security precautions;
- Israel had been involved in responsive action against terrorism and moved
into building a Security Fence, to address incursions from Judea & Samaria/the
West Bank, with international implications at the UN and ICJ;
- Prime Minister Sharon won the 2003 Israeli General Election on his reputation
and the Likud's defense and security platform, with references to Israel
having to make "painful concessions" - but without a Likud platform
addressing them. However, he already spoke of some of issues and the Plan,
in the context of the Road Map at the Fourth Herzliya Conference in December
2003 and at a foreign press conference in January 2004
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process
/Israeli+Disengagement+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm#doc1 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/
Israeli+Disengagement+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm#doc2
- In November 2003, President Bush was reelected as US President. In 2004,
he began his second term with a new Secretary of State, and declared his
intentions of reviving the Road Map / the Peace Process, and demanding progress
from both sides.
- The Disengagement Plan might therefore have been unexpected, but there
is a definite international context to it, with more of a domestic vacuum
around its emergence, and minimal process. To a great extent, PM Ariel Sharon
was playing solo, holding his cards close to his chest, and reserving the
right of the political leader to develop new strategies in changing circumstances
and play center stage - as have others before him.
B. Letter from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to U.S.
President George W. Bush, April 14, 2004
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm
The letter outlines the factors behind PM Sharon's decision to design and
implement the Disengagement Plan:
“The Palestinian Authority under its current leadership has taken
no action to meet its responsibilities under the Roadmap. Terror has not ceased,
reform of the Palestinian security services has not been undertaken, and real
institutional reforms have not taken place. The State of Israel continues
to pay the heavy cost of constant terror. Israel must preserve its capability
to protect itself and deter its enemies, and we thus retain our right to defend
ourselves against terrorism and to take actions against terrorist organizations.
“Having reached the conclusion that, for the time being, there
exists no Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement
and since the current impasse is unhelpful to the achievement of our shared
goals [i.e. two-states coexisting side-by-side -Ed.], I have decided to initiate
a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of reducing friction between
Israelis and Palestinians. The Disengagement Plan is designed to improve security
for Israel and stabilize our political and economic situation. It will enable
us to deploy our forces more effectively until such time that conditions in
the Palestinian Authority allow for the full implementation of the Roadmap
to resume.”
Prime Minister Sharon's original mentioned four
major factors behind his decision to work towards disengagement from Gaza
and northern Samaria
Exercise: What were they?
Analysis Points:
1. The political impasse caused by the lack of a negotiating partner during
the Intifada and because of Yassir Arafat;
2. On-going terrorism/lack of security;
3. The economic situation;
4. The working assumption that in a Final Status Agreement, no Israelis would
be living in the Gaza Strip, while large Jewish population centers in the
West Bank will remain.
C. Prime Minister Sharon's address to the annual Herzliya
Conference on December 16, 2004
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/
Israeli+Disengagement+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm#doc14
Eight months after the publication of the letter to President Bush, Prime
Minister Sharon introduced a number of other factors, not mentioned in his
letter to President Bush:
“Disengagement recognizes the demographic reality
on the ground - specifically, bravely and honestly. Of course it is clear
to everyone that we will not be in the Gaza Strip in the final agreement.
This recognition, that we will not be in Gaza, and that, even now, we have
no reason to be there, does not divide the people and is not tearing us apart,
as the opposing minority claim. Rather, the opposite is true. Disengagement
from the Gaza Strip is uniting the people. It is uniting us in distinguishing
between goals which deserve to be fought for, since they are truly in our
souls - such as Jerusalem, the large settlement blocs, the security zones
and maintaining Israel's character as a Jewish state - rather than goals where
it is clear to all of us that they will not be realized, and that most of
the public is not ready, justifiably, to sacrifice so much for. “One
of the goals of Arab terror was to divide the country and break its spirit.
Stopping terror on the one hand, and the Disengagement Plan on the other,
a plan which the great majority of the public supports, forges national unity
and creates broad national consensus regarding the justness of our struggle
for security, tranquility and peace.
“The initiative of disengagement has produced a long list of
political accomplishments. Because of it, the Palestinians have no excuse
not to abandon terror. Because of it, there is no criticism of Israel's
determined actions against terror. Now it is clear to everyone that when
Israel declares its willingness to make painful compromises, it indeed intends
to make genuine and painful compromises. Very painful.
“Israel's international standing has improved immeasurably.
The most important accomplishment is the understandings between U.S. President
George Bush and me, which provide a new, more stable basis than ever before
for the strategic understandings between Israel and the United States. This
week, we heard President Bush repeat his support for these understandings.
The understandings between the U.S. President and me protect Israel's most
essential interests: first and foremost, not demanding a return to the '67
borders; allowing Israel to permanently keep large settlement blocs which
have high Israeli populations; and the total refusal of allowing Palestinian
refugees to return to Israel.”
On the face of it, the factors mentioned
by Prime Minister Sharon in both his letter to President Bush and his Herzliya
speech most probably were - each to a greater or lesser extent - amongst the
motivating factors.
Exercise: List the factors that appear in this speech.
Analysis Points:
1. The demographic situation vs. the goal of preserving a democratic Jewish
state;
2. The lack of political, military, or economic benefit in Jews living specifically
in the Gaza Strip;
3. General Israeli discontent with having to protect the Jewish communities
in the Gaza Strip;
4. Israel's desire to maintain those areas of the West Bank with large Jewish
populations;
5. The need for implementation of Israeli political consensus as a means of
boosting national morale;
6. The perception that the presence of the IDF and Jewish civilians in the
Gaza Strip provides an excuse for terrorism;
7. International pressure, specifically International condemnation of Israel's
measures against Palestinian terrorism vs. International apathy vis a vis
Palestinian terrorism against Israel;
8. Israel's desire to maintain US support and political coordination between
the two countries.
D. Other Possible Factors
In addition to the twelve factors already mentioned, there are at least three
other interpretations as to what factors led to the formulation of the Disengagement
Plan which have been proffered in various forums. They are:
1. To improve Israel's image and regain international approval, through significant
but relatively minor territorial concessions as part of the Road Map
[http://www.jafi.org.il/education/actual/conflict/roadmap2003/index.html];
2. Prime Minister Sharon's desire to make his mark as an experienced leader
and statesman, particularly in contrast to Yassir Arafat (at that time);
3. Political survival – see D. below (Minority government, leadership
rivalry, ongoing legal investigations).
E. Likud Party Referendum, May 2004
Prime Minister Sharon did not wish to take this to a national referendum
and opted to vote on it in the Likud party in May 2004, where he believed
it would carry a definite majority, but to his dismay, the party membership
voted against the plan (56%). This led him to seek a formula or amended version*
which would be acceptable to the Likud members of the Cabinet and to inform
other Ministers that they would be fired, if they did not vote with the Government
(June 2004)
*http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/
Revised+Disengagement+Plan+6-June-2004.htm .
Not only were two Ichud Leumi (National Union) ministers sacked, but two
Mafdal (NRP) ministers resigned and PM Sharon was left with a minority government
that had little chance of long-term survival. From this point, the Plan was
combined into a proposed Bill that addressed provisions for both the military
and civilian withdrawal and relocation of residents of all the communities
in the Gaza Strip/northern Samaria.
The Israeli Cabinet approved what became known as the Compensation-Evacuation
Bill in June 2004
[http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/DisengageSharon_eng_revised.htm],
but it had little chance of passing in the Knesset. At this point, the settlement
movement began campaigning strongly for a National Referendum on the Disengagement
issue and questioning the Prime Minister's mandate to carry out these sweeping
decisions in a minority government and with support of the left-wing (with
or without the Arab parties in the Knesset). PM Sharon remained firmly against
a Referendum, despite heavy opposition from inside the Likud, and worked towards
winning a parliamentary majority for the Law.
F. Compensation-Evacuation Law
The Law eventually passed on 25th October 2004, with the support of the Labor
Party from the benches of the Opposition.
The Knesset Vote – How & Why
| Party |
For |
Against |
Abstentions |
Absent |
Analysis Points |
| Likud |
23 |
17 |
|
|
Which Ministers opposed it?
(note 1)
(note 2)
|
| Labor |
19 |
|
|
|
|
| Shinui |
14 |
|
|
*1 |
Which MK was absent?
(note 3)
|
| Shas |
|
11 |
|
|
Why did Shas oppose it? Positions |
| Yachad |
6 |
|
|
|
|
| Mafdal-NRP |
|
6 |
|
|
|
| National Union |
*1 |
6 |
|
|
Who supported it in the split vote?
(note 4)
|
| U. Torah Judaism |
|
5 |
|
|
Why did the UTJ oppose it? Positions |
| Am Echad |
2 |
|
*1 |
|
Who opposed it in the split vote?
(note 5) |
| U. Arab List |
2 |
|
|
|
Why did the UAL support it? Positions |
| Hadash |
|
|
3 |
|
Why did Hadash abstain? Positions |
| Balad |
|
|
3 |
|
Why did Balad abstain? Positions |
| Total |
67 |
45 |
7 |
1 |
|
The Government Center-Right Likud Party split its vote, 23 for and 17 against;
The Left and Center-Left parties (Labor, Shinui*, Yachad, Am Echad*) voted
in favor;
The Right and Center-Right parties (Shas, National Union*, National Religious,
and United Torah Judaism) voted against.
See also: Knesset approves PM Sharon's disengagement
plan
G. Political Instability and Disengagement
With a weak, minority Government, the fate of the law became uncertain, particularly
after Shinui resigned on issues of social reform and budget; it was essential
that the government be widened to include other parties, despite internal
Likud opposition to the Labor Party. Labor later joined the Government in
order to ensure that the Disengagement process would not be shelved. Nevertheless,
there was not a majority to support the 2005 Budget and the budget vote was
delayed until the end of March.
The Israeli political right came out in strong opposition and heightened
the public campaign to prevent Disengagement, or – at least - impede
its process (protest, demonstrations, Referendum Law, questioning governmental
process and legitimacy, claims about repression of free speech, delegitimation
of opposition).
The diplomatic context changed somewhat with the death of Yassir Arafat and
new hopes for more peaceful times, law and order, cooperation and coordination
with the PA around Disengagement. This led to the Sharm-el-Sheikh conference
in February 2005, but its immediate outcomes were limited, as were progress
towards democratic reform and improvement in law enforcement in the PA.
While many Likud MKs joined the campaign for a Referendum, the Israeli Labor
Party made it clear that they would withdraw if the Referendum
bill were to pass its first Knesset reading; the Israeli government garnered
the necessary support and the Referendum bill did not pass its first Knesset
reading in March 2004. The budget passed at the end of March and the government
survived.
FAQ: Questions about Disengagement
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Statement on the Day
of the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan