Herzl and the Zionist Movement: From Basle to Uganda - Background Text

by Nili Kadary

Goals:

• 1. To review the development of the Zionist Movement.
• 2. To assess Herzl's political manoevers as leader of the Zionist movement.
• 3. To examine the debate over the Uganda Proposal and the rift it caused in the Zionist movement.

1. The Development of the Zionist Movement between 1897 and 1904

A. Quantative Growth The Zionist movement grew into a Jewish mass movement in these seven years, its size multiplying eightfold in the one year period between the first and second congresses. Subsequently, membership continued increasing at a steady rate.

B. Congresses The central parliamentary organ of the Zionist movement - the Congress - met on a regular basis. From 1887 to 1901, the Congress met annually and thereafter biennially. The basis was laid for the Zionist Central Bank at the Second Zionist Congress; Herzl viewed this as a powerful instrument for political, economic and Zionist activity. The Fifth Congress saw the authorization of a fund for the redemption of lands in Eretz Yisrael.

C. The role of the Russian Zionist movement in the Zionist Organization

At the time of the First Zionist Congress, the Russian Zionist movement provided the mainstay of support for the entire movement, comprising over one third of the delegates. By the Fourth and Fifth Congresses, they accounted for over one half of its represesntatives.

The identification of Jews in Russian with Zionism in this era was very broad and could be found in all strata of the community. The movement's very success in rooting itself in Russian Jewry afforded this group of Zionists a position of prime importance in all the Zionist organizations.

By the Sixth Congress, Herzl succeeded in arousing, establishing and leading a dynamic and developing movement. This, despite the fact that his goal of creating a Jewish state remained a distant reality, because the situation of distress, together with the overwhelming Jewish support for the Zionist aspiration, provided a firm basis for its success. Herzl's achievement in mobilizing Russian Jewry's support was a critical and important stage in the movement's development, because Russian Zionists were to emerge as the leading force of the entire movement. He had thus created a body which would eventually be instrumental in realizing the Zionist goal.

2. Opposition to Herzl

Alongside the dynamic developement of the Zionist movement, which generated waves of enthusiasm throughout the Jewish public, sharp criticism began to appear about Zionism. Opposition to Herzl's policies stemmed from several directions and streams within the Jewish people, and can be summarized as follows:

1. Part of ultra-orthodox Jewry, who viewed Zionism as heresy against the principles of the Jewish religion;
2. A section of the Jewish intelligentsia, who considered Herzl to be a false Messiah, and his movement - a danger to the Emancipation for which they were striving;
3. Well-established, wealthy Jews, who feared for the fate of their businesses and capital should society's attitude to the Jews in general deteriorate.
4. The social-democratic movement in general, and the "Bund" - the Jewish Labor Movement - in particular. The latter claimed that Zionism could not hope to resolve the Jewish problem and would only serve to harm the status of Jewish laborers and sabotage its own recognition as an independent class.

3. Political Activity: The Fight for a Charter

A. Early political orientation - Germany

Herzl began large-scale political campaign activity in Europe on behalf of the supreme Zionist goal - a Jewish state, prodded by the success of the First Zionist Congress to continue the upward diplomatic swing. He set his sights on the first stage of the fulfilment of Zionism, namely: securement of guarantees under common law - in other words, an international political commitment to the right to establish a Jewish state. The second stage he foresaw would be a Charter for the Jews in Eretz Yisrael, which would incorporate the relevant public and legal guarantees. Herzl raised the idea of a Charter after it became clear to him that the conditions to establish a sovereign Jewish state in Eretz Yisrael had not yet been created.

Germany was, at that time, the major European power, and Herzl correspondingly allotted her a central role in the scenario. Even in his early days, Herzl attempted to meet with Kaiser Wilhelm II, with the idea he could persuade him of the justness of the Zionist cause. From there, he hoped to gain access to the Court of the Turkish Sultan at Kushta, since Germany's ties to Turkey were the closest of all the European powers.

When Herzl met the Duke of Baden, the Kaiser's uncle, he tried to persuade him of the importance of a meeting with Kaiser Wilhelm for the Zionist cause. After more than one and a half years of fruitless contacts with influential German figures, Herzl was called to the German consul during a stay in Amsterdam and informed that the German Kaiser was prepared to meet him on his journey to Jerusalem.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's first stop on his journey to the land of Israel was at Kushta. In October 1898, Herzl traveled to Kushta, where he met with the Kaiser for the first time and received a promise of a subsequent meeting in Jerusalem.

Herzl and his companions went up to Jerusalem in an optimistic frame of mind to wait the second meeting, which took place on November 2. His frosty reception by the Kaiser and the lack of protocol led Herzl to realize that the German monarch had withdrawn his initial offer of support for Jewish settlement in the land of Israel.

B. Second political orientation - Turkey

After diplomatic moves towards Germany had failed, Herzl decided to approach the leaders of the Ottoman Empire for a Charter, without mediators. Turkey's heavy debts to the European powers formed the crux of Herzl's negotiations at Court in Kushta. He put forward the idea that the Zionist movement could assist Turkey defray its debts, in return for which the Zionists would be granted a charter for Jewish settlement under the Turkish aegis.

Herzl made five journeys to Kushta for his political ends. The Sultan offered, for a considerable sum, to settle Jews in Syria, Aram Naharayim, the Anatolian plateau, or anywhere else in the Ottoman Empire - except the land of Israel. Herzl rejected all these offers and continued his funding campaign, in the hope that this would change the nature of proceedings at Kushta. In July 1902, he was urgently recalled to Kushta. It emerged that the drawn-out negotiations with the Turks had been a deliberate attempt to filibuster to prevent the Zionists negotiating simultaneously with the French and to ensure the most favorable terms for the Turks.

There are three major reasons which contributed to Herzl's failure in his negotiations with the Turks:

1. To some degree, Jewish bankers and businessmen in Western Europe carry responsibility for failing to invest in the Zionist effort, and thus weakening Herzl's bargaining position.
2. From the outset, the Turkish sultan did not view Herzl as a serious partner to a deal, as evidenced by Turkish opposition on principle to Zionist settlement of a sovereign character in Eretz Yisrael.
3. Herzl's own tactics were partly responsible for his failure. The central figure in the Zionist movement did not prepare the ground properly for his work and his negotiations with the Turks lacked any realistic basis in terms of the movement's capacity to conduct a large-scale and complicated financial operation of this nature.

C. Third Political Orientation - Britain

Herzl's lack of success in obtaining a Charter from the Ottoman Empire did not discourage his efforts, and he turned instead to Britain.

The large wave of Jewish immigration to Britain at the end of the nineteenth century was a cause of concern to its heads of government, in view of the opposition it had generated within public opinion to its continuation. After it was debated in Parliament and the press, a Royal Commission was appointed to examine the immigration issue. The Commission called upon Herzl, as leader of the Zionist movement, to appear before it as an expert on the issue of Jewish migration. Herzl believed that the circumstances surrounding the issue provided an excellent opportunity to convince important British governmental figures to support the idea of a state for the Jews. It was the first time he had made public an idea he had already mooted in his own circle: Jewish settlement in British controlled territory adjacent to the land of Israel - such as Cyprus, or El Arish in the Sinai peninsula - as a temporary shelter for the masses of persecuted Jews. [It was his hope that this would serve temporarily until time proved right for a Charter for Eretz Yisrael.] The proposal for the settlement of East European Jews in the Sinai peninsula fell through, but Herzl continued relentlessly to look for a temporary solution to the problem of refuge. The British Colonial Secretary offered Herzl the possibility of Uganda, which the latter rejected; he returned to it, however, as other developments made a solution imperative.

4. The Uganda Scheme

A. The Kishinev Pogrom At Easter 1903, a pogrom of unprecedented dimensions swept through Kishinev. It deeply shocked the Russian intelligentsia, including Gorky and Tolstoy, as well as European public opinion.

B. Herzl in Russia The Russian government now sought to soften the effects of the pogrom and invited Herzl to Russia for "discussions" with its heads government. Herzl responded favorably, because he wished to obtain permission for the Zionist movement to operate legally in Russia. He also felt this would be an opportunity to show support for Russian Jewry and moderate the authorities' attitude towards its Jews.

In Russia, Herzl met Minister .... von Plehve. Although there were no direct outcomes from this encounter, his visit provided the opportunity to meet with the Jewish masses who came to see their "king", an overwhelming and emotional experience in itself. He returned home under the impressions of this encounter and their hardship, determined to reconsider the Uganda proposal as a temporary option. Almost immediately followed the sixth Congress in Basle.

C. The Uganda Proposal - The Rift and its Consequences

Herzl reported to the six hundred delegates at the Zionist Congress on his journey to Russian as well as the failure of negotiations with both Turkey and Germany. Then he dropped his Uganda "bombshell". A furious argument erupted between supporters of this proposal and its opponents. A proposal was brought to send out a committee of inquiry to Uganda. 295 delegates voted in favor; 175 against; 132 abstained. The rift was unavoidable. Most of its supporters were from western Europe, while its opponents were the Russian Zionists [including the Kishinev contingent]. The Russian Zionist leaders accused their west European colleagues, and particularly Herzl, of not understanding the terrible tragedy taking place in eastern Europe. Weizmann [later, the first President of the State of Israel] said they had not understood that, "Russian Jewry, with all its suffering, is not prepared to translate its dreams and longings for the land of their fathers to any other location."

The leader of the "nays" was Dr. Yehiel Chlenov, who maintained that Herzl's victory would herald the downfall of the Zionist movement. At the height of the furious debate, many of the dissenters to the proposal left their seats, wept openly, fainted or sat on the floor as a sign of mourning. There was serious concern that the Zionist movement had come to the end of the way. Herzl now appreciated the force of the opposition and the only way open to him was that of reconciliation. In his last addreess to the Congress, he reiterated that Uganda was only a temporary solution, raised his right hand and vowed: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning."

The Uganda Proposal demonstrated that Herzl failed to understand the depths of belief in Zionism, in particular among the Russian Zionists [and despite the fact that it was intended to resolve the situation of Russian Jewry.]

Herzl, after the failure of the Uganda Proposal, was a broken man. Over the seven years he had led the Zionist movement, his health had deteriorated; after "Uganda", there was a further deterioration. Nevertheless, he continued his efforts towards the ultimate goal and traveled to meet the Pope and the King of Italy. In July 1904, he died of heart disease.

"Only once in several millenia is such a wonderful person born," wrote seventeen-year old David Gryn [later, David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel] of Herzl at this time. His words spoke for many.

In August 1949, Herzl was reinterred in Jerusalem, under the terms of his will, on the site of the Mount Herzl, named in his honor.

The Education Department of the Jewish Agency for Israel
Unit for Jewish Education in the CIS

Editor: Yossi Pnini Internet Version:
Editor: Gila Ansell Brauner